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Developing  countries  are increasingly  aware  of the desirability
of using taxes  to capture a share  of the rents from local natural
resources.  The time has come  in many  countries  when the gains
may be much greater if the rather crude forms of resource
taxation  - such  as royalties,  production  taxes,  and  export  levies
- were replaced by simple forms of rent taxes rath_r than
attempting  to refine existing  taxes further.
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effort in the department to analyze public policy options for natural resource taxation. Copies of the paper
are available free from the World Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433. Please contact Carlina
Jones, room N 10-063, extcnsion 37699 (October 1993, 57 pages).
Natural iesources are typically subject both to  not offer full deductions for all costs, especially
taxation under the income tax system and to  capital costs. Some systems tax revenues without
special resource taxes. Properly designed income  allowing any deductions for costs; others allow
taxes attempt to include capital income on a  the deduction of current costs only. As a result,
uniform basis. But in most countries the income  they discourage investment activity in resource
tax treats resource industries more favorably than  industries, encourage the exploitation of high-
most other industries - through favorable  grade relative to low-grade resources, and make
treatment of such capital expenses as depletion,  it difficult to impose high tax rates for fear of
exploration and development, and the cost of  making the marginal tax rate higher than  100
acquiring resource properties.  percent.
The case for special resource taxes is pre-  Boadway and Flatters discuss three altema-
cisely to tax resource rents over and above the  tive "ideal" ways for the governnent  to divert a
levies implicit in general income taxes. There are  share of rents to the public sector:
two justifications for this: (1) the efficiency-
based argument that a tax on resource rents is  * Levy a tax on rents, ideally in the form of a
nondistorting and complementary, and (2) the  cash flow tax.
"equity" argumelAt  that the property rights to
resources ought to accrue to the public at large  * Require firms to bid for the rights to exploit
rather than to private citizens since the rents  resources.
represent the bounty nature has bestowed on the
economy rather than a reward for economic  *  Take a share of equity in the firm.
effort.
They discuss these options in terms of their
If the main purpose of a resource tax is to  implications for t-he  ability of firms to obtain
capture rents for the public sector, the base of  finance, the allocation of risk, the share of rents
resource taxes should be economic rents (or their  accruing to the public sector, the extent of
present value equivalent), contend Boadway and  involvement of foreign firms, and other factors.
Flatters.
The time has come in many countries, thev
Actual resource taxes differ from rent taxes  say, when gains from further refinement of
in significant ways. Unlike a gencral income tax  imperfect existing taxes on resources are less
- which allows the resource industries to  than replacing them with simpler, more efficient
understate capital income - resource  taxes often  forms of pure rent taxes.
overstate rents. This is because they typically do
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- iii  -THE  TAXATION  OF  NATURAL  RESOURCES:
PRINCIPLES  AND  POLICY  ISSUES
by
Robin  Boadway  and  Frank  Flatters
Queen's  University,  Kingston,  Canada
EXECUTIVE  SUMMARY
Resouirce taxes  are  part  of  the  overall  svstern  of taxes  which  impinge  upon  the
incomes of businesses.  The system  usually includes  direct  income  taxes of a general
nature,  indirect  taxes  of various  sorts  including  sales  and  excise  taxes  as  well as
export  and  import  duties,  and  taxes  specifically designed  for resource  industries.
Income  taxes  are  intended  to  tax  capital  and  personal  income  of  residents
and,  where possible,  of non-residents  earning  income in  the  country  of taxation.  If
designed ]properly, income taxes tax  all capita] incorrme  on a uniforin basis, including
both  the  normal  return  to capital  and  any  rents.  In most  countries,  however,  the
capital  income  tax  system  treats  resource  industries  quite  favourably  relative  to
other  industries.  This  occurs  mainly  because  of the  favourable  treatment  afforded
various  capital  expenses.  stch  as exploration  and development,  the cost of acquiring
resource  properties  and  depletioni.  The  consequence  is that  equity  income  in  the
resource  industries  is often  un(lertaxed  relative  to other  industries.
The  case for special  resource  taxes  is precisely  to  tax  resource  rents  over  and
above  the  levies  that  are  implicit  in  general  income  taxes.  There  are  two  jus-
tifications  for  this.  One  is  the  efficierncy-based argunment that  resource  rents  are
non-distorting.  The other  one, which is complementary,  is that  the property  rights
to  resources  ought  to  accrue  to  the  public  at large  rather  than  to  private  citizens,
since they  represent  the bounties  nature  has bestowed  on the economy rather  than
a reward  for economic  effort of sorme sort.  This  can be  viewed as a sort  of equity
argument.
Given that  the mnain  purpose  of resource taxation  is to capture  rents,  the appro-
priate  form  of taxation  is one whose base is econormic rents.  Actual  resource  taxes
seem to  differ from  rent  taxes  in  sigiifican'r  ways.  Unlike with  the  general  income
I whch  includes  provisions which allow the resource induistries to understate cap-
ital  inc-me.  resource  taxes  often  overstate  rents.  This  is because  they  frequently
-lo not  offpr full deductions  for  all costs.  particularly  capital  costs.  Some  systems
tax  revennu s .x  r  ut  givir.g any  deductioin for costs:  others  allow c irrent  costs  tobe  deducted.  As  a  consequence,  they  discourage  investment  activity  in  the  reoiirce
industries,  encourage  the  exploitation  of high  gra(les  of resources  at  the  expense  of
low  grades,  and  make  it  difficuilt  to  imp)ose  higlh tax  rates  for  fear  of  iriaking  the
marginal  tax  rate  gree  _r  than  100%.
There  are  three  alternative  'ideal'  ways  for  the  government  to  divert  a  share
of  rents  to  the  public  sector.  The  first  is  to  levy  a  tax  oIn rents.  The  ideal  sort
of  rent  tax  is  a  tax  on  the  real  cash  flows  of  resource  firins.  For  noni-renewable
resource  firrns,  the  base  woul(i  include  all revenues  on  a cash  b)asis less all current  anr(
capital  costs  including  (osts  of acquiring  resource  proplerties,  exploration  expenses,
development  expenses  an(l  any  processing  expenses  inicurred  by  the  rtsource  firm.
For  renewable  resource  firms,  similar  costs  woul(d  be  deducted  including  costs  of
property  rights,  harvesting  cos's,  any  rei.ewal  costs  such  as replanting  or  restocking,
as  well  as  any  processing  costs  done  by  the  firm.  There  shotuld  be  Ino) deductions
for  other  taxes  paid.  Of course,  cash  flow accounting  should  be  done  from  a  social
point  of view  so  any  external  costs  should  be  inc'uded  as  costs  on  a  cash  basis.  It
may  also  be  necessary  to  require  the  firrm to  cover  the  external  cost  associated  with
shutting  down,  though  that  may  be  doiuc by  forcing  firms  to  post  bon(ls  an(l/or
through  other  formns of  regulation.  Both  corporations  and  unincorporated  firms
should  be  subject  to  the  tax.
The  principal  difficulty  with  a  full-fle(dged  cash  flow  tax  is  that  it  generaily
iml)lies  that  tax  liabilities  will be  negative  for  new  and/or  growing  firms.  Fully  re-
fundable  tax  credits  are  called  for in these  circumstances.  Governments  are  reluctant
to  nmake such ipaym1ents,  and( firiis  are  unilikely to  believe  government  commrlitments
to  inake  therml. However,  this  problem  can  be  solved  by  using  a  modified  cash-flow
tax  base  in  whicL  the  firm  can  capitalize  cost  deductions  in  a  straightforward  way.
In  particular,  aniy costs  can  be  capitalized,  aIl(l those  that  are  receive  a full  nonmiinal
initerest  deduction  based  o0! the  ful'l book  value  of the  capitalized  cost.
The  second  way  for  thc  government  to  share  in  the  rents  is  to  require  i>rms
to  bidl for  the  riglhts  to  exploit  resources.  In the  case  of  non-renewable  resources,
this  woul(l  occur  prior  to  the  exl)loration  stage.  r'or  renewable  resources,  the,  bid
would  be  for  a  knowii  stock  of  resources.  As  long  as  the  bidding  system  were
competitive  and  all  bidders  were  equally  well  informcd.  thc  value  of the  bid  would
be  equal  to  expected  future  net  rents  (net  of futuire  expected  taxes)  corrected  for
a  risk  factor.  For  such  a  system  to  work,  the  prop)erty  rights  obtained  must  be
perpetual.  Otherwise,  there  woul(d be  anl incentive  for  the  operator  to  extract  the
resource  inefficiently.
Even  with  a  well-functioning  auction.  the  crtnsequences  can  (liffer  fromn that
under  a  rent  tax.  For  one  thinig.  the  auction  will  yield  1000/%c  of the  expected  value
of  the  rents  to  the  bidder.  whereas  the  tax  rate  irlav  be  less  thani  that.  Under  anlauction,  the  cash flow cons  quences  are much different  as well. Net  rents  rnust  be
entirely  paid  ul) front,  whereas  with  taxes  they  are spread  out  into  the  future.  If
there  are any capital  rnarket  constraints,  this will be reflected  in the size of the  bid.
Also, the risk effects can be diffr'rent.  Under  the  auction  systerm, the  firm is forced
to  bear  the  risk  associated  with  resource  exploitation,  whereas  with  the  cash  flow
tax  the  public  sector  shares  the  risk.  One important  reason  why the  public  sector
may  b-  better  at  d-aling  with, risk is that  soIme of thi. risk facing  the  operator  is
the  risk  of higher  taxes  in  the  .'a ure.  The  time  iniconisistenicy  which  gives rise  to
this  will  le  more  severe  tinder  any  system.  Thlus while  this  risk  makes  it  rxioi  e
appropriate  to  use an  auctiori systo;,:n,  it also reduces  the  l)rice that  bi(lders will be
willing  to pay for a long termil  lease.
Firnally, the public  sector  may obtain  a share  of the rents  by taking  on a share
of equity  in  the  firm.  One  way is  for  the  governmerlt  to  contribute  to  a  share
of  'he  costs  and  claim  an  equivalent  share  of the  equity.  This  would  be  financial
equivalent  to  a  cash  flow tax,  though  perhaps  rnore  difficult  to  implement.  The
public  sector  would have to idenitify both  the cash  costs and  the revenules accruiing
on  the  relevant  operat'  -n of the  firm.  On the other  hand,  unlike  with  a  cash  flow
tax,  this  gives  the  pubiic  sector  a  sav in  the  decision-making  responsibilities  that
come with  share ownership.  As we'll,  it inay be privy to information  that  it otherwise
would  not  obtain.  With  cash  flow taxation,  by contrast,  tile  gi)vernmenit is only  a
silent  partner.
The  above  rmethod requires  the  governmeint to  provide  cash  up) front.  This
could  he avoidle(d  if, instead  of 1)eiIig  p)rovj(ied with  money up fronit, the  firm could
deduct  its  share  of the  -osts later  on against  dividenlds.  As long  as the  costs  were
appropriately  deducted  with  interest,  the  scheme  would  l)e financially  equivalent  to
the  cash-iiow equivalent  schemes outlined  earlier.  As with  taxation  but  in contrast
to  auctions,  equity  participation  schemes will divert  less thani 100%o  of the rents  to
the public  sector.
Revenue-raising  policies actually  used will generally  differ froIm those  outlined
above.  This  irmplies that  they are not pure rent  c,)Jlecting devices, ani(i  hence distort
resource  allocation  decisions as well. InI the case of taxes. it has  b)een the exception
rather  than  the  rule  that  rent  taxes  have  been  tiUsed  in  the  resoIIrce inIdustries.
Indeed,  there  are very few examples  of cash  flow type  taxes.  We consi(ler the most
commonly  used  taxes.
Perhaps  the  most  common  form of resource  charge  has  been  a  levy based  on
the9 quantity  extracteJ,  variously  referred  to as  a royalty  or severance  tax  in non-
renewable  resources  antd a  sturmpage fee in  forestry.  It  is  difficult  to  uniderstand
thc  attraction  of this  type  of charge apart  from  simplicity.  Somietimes these  levies
have been  viewed less as  a form  of tax  than  as  a fee chlarged l)y the  public  scctorfor  remiiovinig  resources  from  public  or  Crown  lanids.  However,  from  an  economnic
poinlt of view,  theiy are e(luivalent  to a  prodluction  tax.  In their  simple  formti,  they
tax  revenues  with  no accounting  for costs.  As such,  they  act  as a  disince.itivc  for
investment  and  extraction  of resources  an(l coincidentally  generate  less revenue for
the  public  sector  than  could( be  obtaine(d  by  a  rent  tax.  Furthermore,  since  no
account  is taken  of costs,  they discriminate  against  high-cost  reveutle sources at  the
expense  of low-cost olnes. This effect of crudle royalty  systemiis  is generally  known as
high-grading  of thc  resource.
The  effect .,f produlction  taxes  can  differ  according  to  whether  the  tax  rate  is
based  on (quantity  produce(l  (per  uniit tax)  or upon  the  selling price  (ad  vatoremn).
In principle,  an  ad valorern rate  can always be chosen such that  it is equivalenit to  a
given per  unlit rate.  When  prices are changing,  ad valo7irn aIi(l per unit production
taxes  will lhave different  effects.  Sirnce ad valocmrn  taxes  rise withl increasing  prices
(and  vice versa),  this  implies  that  an  ad valorern tax  has  sonic  risk-sharing  effect
that  the per unit does not have, and(  in peziods of rising resource taxes, it discourages
investmrent more.  Similar effects occur when  the citiality of a resource  varies within
a given deposit.
Increasingly,  royalty schemes have been designed to be more sophisticated  than
simple production  taxes.  Some royalty bases have been dlefined to be revenues net of
some measure  of current  costs.  This goes part  way towards  making  royalties  reflect
rents.  Another  method  is to  make  the  royalty  rate  itself  a  sliding scale  !)ased on
either resource  prices (an  excess pTicef  tax) or on the quality  of the resource.  These
are sormetimes referred  to as windfall taxes, reflecting the fact that  purpose  has been
seen as a way of creaiming off resource rents  generated  by price increases.  Again, this
is an imperfect  way of taxing  resource  renks ir  ggeneral, although  it  can succeed  in
obtaining  chan)ges in rents  from e-isting  resource firnms  who have benefited  from an
uinexpecte(d increase  in  price.  However, this  is done  at  thf; expense  of discouraging
incrermnental investments.
Resource properties  are usually  also subject  to general  income 'taxes.  However,
in  some  instances,  taxes  specific to  the resource  industries  are  also based  onl somre
measur']  of income.  In stuch cases, the  tax  is often  designed  in similar  ways to  the
general  income  tax and  has built  into it soirie of the same biases.  That  is, it affords
rapid  write-offs  for acquisition  costs, exploration  and  development,  and  often  gives
a  depletion  allowance.  Although  this  generates  some  revenues,  it  also  provides  a
subsidy  to marginal  projects.  That  is, average  tax rates  are p)'sitive  while marginal
tax  rates  are  negative.  Furthermore.  the  rate  of return  to  equity  at  which  they
usually  becomc  effective  has  tended  to  be  extremely  high,  so that  they  have  not
been very  effective collectors  of excess profits  or rents.
Sorne tax regimes impose  an annual  rental  fee or charge for the use of resourceproperties.  If their  ratos  were such as to  refle :t the  true  capital  valuc of the  prop-
erties  being  used(, they  ,oulld be  like a rent  tax.  However, they  are  typically  set
at  arbitrary  and  more  or  les.  aiorninal rates.  It  would  be  difficult  to  administer
sulch a  tax  based  on  the  true  economic  valve of the  resource property  in  question
since rnarket values  do  not  exist.  Thus,  sorne administrative  discredion  WOi.iY be
required.  If all anniual rent  tax is to  be charge'1 it seerns preferabl1c to  use a proper
rent  tax.
In primary  prolduct  exportinig  countries,  cxport  taxes  have  been  aL  imiajor source
of government  revenue. if the country  is a pr  -e taker  on international  mnarkets, anl
export  tax  has exactly the same effcct as a  production  tax  frorm the point  of view
of  the  prodtucers.  From  this  viewpoint,  therefore,  export  taxes  share  the  same
difficulties  as  prodtuctiorn taxes  in  collecting  rents  for  the  governnment.  However,
consumers  pay  a  lower price  under  the  export  tax.  Although  tl.(re  miay be some
distributive  reasons  for  prcferring  an  export  tax,  iriost (:ountries.  have foun(d tllat
export  taxes  on  resnurce  products  (e.g.  rubber  in  Malaysia)  have been  regressive.
Taxes on exports  to irduce  local downstream  processing  industries  can also be a very
costly way of dis;' pating resource  rents.  Evril in cases where the resource-e.-porting
country  rnight  have a long  terni  comparative  a(lvanitage in  furtner  processing,  the
use of export  taxes  to  speed  up the  process car? be very  costly.
Expert  taxes inay be justified  if the coutnrtry  has sonie monopoly power in world
rmarkets by  the  usual  optimai  tariff  argurnents.  If so,  that  woulld be  a  separate
justification  for export  taxes  over anid above  rent  collectioni devices.
Auction  systemls tend  not  to  be used much, especially  nTl  developing  countries.
One  reason  might  be  that  the  con(litions  do  not  lernd themselves  to  cornpetitive
bidding  procedures.  Many  resource  pro ccts  are  large  and  may  not  involve  mnore
than  one different investor  at the same tiine,  For whatever  reasons,  iiudividual deals
are struck  with  resource prodlucers involving different  types  of pul)lic p  rticipationi.
These  cani take  various  formi,
Under  the siniplest  fornm  of production  sharinig is that  iii which the government
takes  a given share  of the  Prodtuct. It  is analogous  to sharecropping  in  agr:cul.ure,
and  is identical  to  an  ad valc-em production  tax  at  the  same rate.  It  differs from
a  tax  on  pure  rent  since no  . sts are  deducted.  Since it  is ad valorem,  some  risk-
sharing  is implicit  in the  scheme.
Since produiction sharing  schemices  are subject  to  negotiation,  the proportion  of
sharing  could  vary from  project  to  project.  In this  way some account  can be taken
of different  potential  rents.  However. as long  as costs  are  not  explicitly  deducted,
such schemes will not  reflect  pure rents.SonXe  schemnes  accountt  for costs partially by havinig  the production sharing cut
in  only  afte.:  some  minimium  guarantee  level  of  revenues.  As  well  as  allowing  the
firm  to  cover  some  part  of  initial  costs  before  sharirng  its  outpt.t,  this  provi(les  an
ad(ditional  mneasure of  risk-sharinig.  However,  even  if  the  minrirrmumri  were  set  such
that  total  costs  were  covered,  dhere would  still  be  a  marginal  disincentive  involve(d
once  the  production  sharirng  begins  to  apl)ly.
Gover:1e11neits Illay  also  n1egotiat2  to  adopt  equity  l)ositionls in  resource  firrins.
At  one  extreme,  the  government  cdtuldl simpl)ly  l)tlrchase  si  -es of  a resource  firm  oIn
the  open  market.  Since  the market  value  of the  firmn shotul(d capitalize  all  expected
future  net  renits  o2 the  firln,  however,  thlis wouild  not  be  expected  to  yield  anly net
revenues  to  the  government.  To  facilitate  rent  transfer  to  the  governeniit,  the
governmiiienit  Imust succeed  ili obtaiining  shareholdinlg  privileges  at  below  the  rvntrket
value  of the  shares.
At  the  other  extreme,  the  governlnenlt  imxay  simply  take  "free  equity"  in  the
firm,  theieby  entitling  itself  to  a  share  of future  dividend(s  of  the  firm.  'I'his  will
differ  fronm a  rent  tax  regimc  ly  thie fact  that  no  implicit  deduction  is given  for  the
initial  equity  put  in  by  the  firm.  This  nmay approxiniiate  the  initial  capital  costs
incurred  by  the  firm.  It  would  then  be  similar  to  a  royalty  system  with  current
costs  (leducted.
Instead  of  taking  free  equity,  the  government  may  pay  sonle  price  for  it.  To
obtainl some  -),are  of  the  rents,  the  price  woul(d lhave to  be  less  thani  the  market
price  of  the  shares  taken.  Equity  sharirlg  schermies of this  forimi will  be  equivalent
to  rent  taxes  if  the  payment  inade  l)y the  governrrlenit  is  equal  in  present  value  to
an  equivalent  shlare  of  the  cash  costs  of  the  project.  If  this  payment  is  made  up
front,  it  woul(l  have  the  identical  financial  effect  as  a  cash  flow tax.  The  onliy  real
difference  is  that  the  government  obtains  voting  rights.  If the  payment  is  spread
out  into  the  futuire  ke.g., taken  out  of futu.re  dividends),  it  should  be carried  forward
withi  interest.  In  either  casc., the  governnrlt  will  obtain  only  a  share  of  the  refits
ratiaer  tllaIl  the  entire  amouniit.  system.
There  are  a  number  of other  design  issues  involved  in  resource  taxation  which
may  cause  them  to  differ  from  ideal  rent  taxes.  Arrangements  with  the  private
sector  for  sliarinlg  rents  are  sometimes  specified  oiily  for  a  limited  period  of  time.
This  may  bet because  of  conlscious  design,  or  it  may  be  because  of  the  inevitable
inability  of governrilernts  to  commit  to  fixed  policies  for  long  periods  of time.  In  any
case,  the  result  is an  inefficiency  which  is  hard  to  avoid.
Many  non-renewable  resource  operations  face  costs  of shut-down  such  as clean-
iij) costs  to  avoid  environmental  danmage.  Sirnply  requiring  firms  to  meet  such  costs
may  be  unenforceable  since  they  may  be  able  to  avoid  thern  by  just  abandoningthe  site.  Clean  up  could  be  eniorced  by  requiring  the  firm  to  post  bonds  against
the  cost  of cleanup,  or,  equivalently,  by irnposing  a  withhol(ling  tax  in respect  of
resource  management  which  is refundable  once  the  clean, up  is completed.
Sornc sorts  of policies  rnay iiivolve administrative  discretion.  Economtists genl-
erally  view these  sorts  of policies  with  some  suspicion  and  prefer  those  for  which
he  terms  of eligibility  are au`omatic.  Discretionary  policies often  lend themselves
to costly  rent-seeking  behaviour.
In  inany countries  jurisdiction  over  resources  is  decentralized  at  least  partly
to  lower  levels of government.  This  can give rise  to  prol)lermls  of tax  coordination
among  various  levels of governmrent as well as  to  different  fiscal capacities  among
lower levels of government.  As the  literature  on fiscal federalisrm makes  clear,  the
latter  can cause inequities  across the  federation  and  inefficiency in the  allocation  of
mobile factors  of production  in favour of the wealthier  states.  Many countries  have
instituted  mechanisms  to  enable  at least  some share  of resource  rent  to  be  shared
among  states.
Many  of the  firms  that  operate  in less  developed  countries  are foreign  firms.
This  gives rise  to  various  other  issues.  For one,  certain  tax  measures  may be  pre-
ferred  to  others  to  the  extent  that  foreign  tax  crediting  is  facilitated.  Use of the
income  tax  system  rather  than  free equity  or production  sharing  arrangements  nlay
have that  property.  As well, the ability of foreign conmpanies  to shift profits  through
transfer  pricing  and  other  means  will limit  the extent  to which some types  of taxes
on resource  rents  will be effdctive. This  may help to  account  for the growing use of
other  mneasures  such a.: royalties,  equity  participation and leasing of property  rights.
Developing country  governments  have become increasingly  conscious of the  de-
sirability  of levying taxes on econoImic  rents  arising froni natural  resources  occurring
within  their  boundaries.  At the  same  time  they  have shown increasing  sophistica-
tion in modifying  the crude fiscal instrurnents  that  have been traditionally  used for
this  purpose  in order  to  both  decrease  the  efliciency costs  arising  from  the  use  of
imperfect  rent  taxes  and increase  the  proportionl of the rents  that  they  are able  to
attachi for public  purposes.  The  time  has now been  reached  in many  countries  at
which  the gains from further  refinement  of what  are basically very crude  taxes such
as royalties  and  export  levies might  be far  exceeded by replacing  them  with  rriuch
simp)ler forms of pure  rent  taxes.THE  TAXATION  OF  NATURAL  RESOURCES:
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I.  INTRODUCTION
The raising  of revenues from the economric  activity  associated  with  the exploitation
of natural  resources  is virtually  a universal  phenomenon  among  the  nations  of the
world.  This  can  take several  different forms.  It  may consist  of taxes  specific to  the
resources  in question.  It may involves special mreasures applicable  selectively  to  the
resource industries  within more general  systems of taxation  (such as the corporation
income  tax).  Or,  it may consist  of varying  degrees of public  owners.iip  of resource
property  rights  ranging  from ownership  of the  resource  being exploited  which  are
sold or  leased  to  private  sector  resoarce  firms,  to joint  public-private  ventures,  to
outright  public  ownership  and  operation  of the  resource  firnms themselves.  Our
purpose  in this study  is to concentrate  on the use of taxation  measures  by the public
sector  to extract  revenues fromn  resources industries,  especially  taxes  specific to the
resource  sector.  However, we will not  be able to do so in  isolation  frorn these other
measures,  some of which  represent  relatively  close substittutes  for taxation.  In this
introductory  section  we set  the stage for the  subsequent  analysis  by outlined  some
general features  of resource industries  and resource taxation  found across countries.
It is useful to  begin with  some discussion of the types  of resources  themselves.
Natural  resources  consist of the various materials  endowed uipon a nation  by nature
which  are u.seful in  the  production  of goods and  services.  It  is cornmon  to  classify
natural  resources  as being  of two broa(d types,  though  the distinctiorl  is sometimes
ambiguous.  They  are the  following:
Renewable Resources.  Renewable resources are those that  can generate  a continuous
flow of output  for an indefinite  period of timrie.  They include  such things  as fisheries,
forests,  hydro-electricity,  water  supplies,  clean  air  and  agricultural  land.  In  each
case,  as some of the  resource is taken  for econormic use, the  resource  can replenish
itself  by natural  or artificial  means  A characteristic  feature  of renewable  resources
is that  the level of flow of resource that  can be sustained  is an endogenous  variable.
It  can depend  upon  the stock of the resource that  is maintained,  upon natural  rates
of renewal  of the resources  (e.g..  biological rates  of growth)  and  upon  coinservation
and  husbandry  practices  of those exploiting  the resources  (e.g., replantirng of forests.
1regulations on the size of fish taken, fertilization practices, use of reservoirs, etc.).
In some cases, it is also true that  the dynamrlics  of resource renewal are such that
extinction of the stock can occur in the case of overexploitation. The tax treatmient
of renewable resources necessarily involves consideration of the  dynamics of the
resource renewal process. In some cases, the exploitation may involve a continuouls
flow of output (e.g., fisheries, hydro-electricity); in others, it may involve a scries of
cycles of extraction and replenishment, as when clear-cuitting is use(d  in forests.
Non-Renewable Resources. Non-renewable resources are those such that,  in  prin-
ciple, there  is a fixed amount available for use.  Two types  r;i industries  account
for the most important  non-renewable resources  hydro-carboni  fuels (oil and gas)
and mining.  The latter,  in tutrn, can be subdivided into nmetallic  and non-mretallic
mining,  and  these can be subdivided according to  type of resource.  Thus,  base
and  precious metals  are often distinguished within the  metal rmining  sector,  and
so on.  The  two broad categories, oil and gas and rnining, share some features  in
common, but  they also differ in some important  ways. Both are non-renewable in
the sense that there is ultimately a fixed stock of the resouirce  (ignoring the fact that
hydro-carbons regenerate themselves over very long periods of time).  The stock is,
however, typically both  of unknown size and of variable quality.  Because it is of
unknown size, new deposits must continually be discovered and there is an explo-
ration industry which is devoted to that.  The tax treatment of exploration activities
will be of some importance for our later discussion. The variability of quality can
come about  because of (different  concentrations of the resource in a given deposit
or of differing costs of extraction. Differences  in quality are also important for tax
policy since they res-It  in different costs to the econiomy  of obtaining the resource.
A related characteristic of  ioin-renewable  resources is that  they are typically found
in impure formn.  that  is, mrixed  with other elements. This implies that fuirther pro-
cessing is an important  part  of obtaining the  resource.  This,  too,  will have tax
implications.  One  way  in  which  oil  and  gas  differs  from  mining  is  that  many  of its
products  can  be  used  only  once.  Thus,  natural  gas  and  engine  gasoline  are  burned
off  when  used.  On  the  other  hand,  the  products  of  mining  can  often  be  re-used.
This  mneans that  there  can  be  an  active  recycling  industry.  In  that  sense.  they
approach  being  renewable  resources.







2Processing  itself  may  consist  of several  steps  including  cor.nentrating,  mrilling, etc.
At  any  stage  beyond  extraction,  there  rnay also be the  holding of inventory,  which
involves decision-rnaking.
Governments  inmpose  a  variety  of types  of taxes  and  other  levies on  their  re-
sources  industries.  Taxes of a  general  broad-based  sort,  such as the  corporate  tax
and  general  sales taxes,  also  apply  to the  resource  industries.  However, they  often
have special  provisions  applying  to the  latter.  For exainple,  corporate  tax  systerns
often  allow rapid  write-offs  for  resource  activities  such  as exploration  and  devel-
oprrient  as well as special  depletion  allowances  on non-renewable  resources.  There
may  also be  investment  incentives  such  as preferential  tax  rates,  tax  holidays  and
investment  tax  credits.  Higher  sales  tax  rates  may be  levied  on  the  consumption
of oil and  gas  products.  These  broad-based  taxes tend  to  be levied  on a  residence
basis,  that  is, on the  tax  base of taxpayers  resident  in  the country  levying the  tax.
Taxes  specific  to  the  resource  industries  are  most  often  applied  on  a  source
basis,  that  is,  on  the  tax  base  in  the  country  where  the  base  is  generated.  The
simplest  of these  is a specific output  or production  tax  levied on either  the  output
or  the  revenues  of a resource  industry.  In  the  mining  industry,  this  is sometimes
referred  to  as a severance tax.  When  the property  rights  to  the resource  are owned
by the  state,  it  may be  referred  to  as a  royalty.  In the  case of forestry,  it is some-
times  called  a  stumpage  fee.  The  rate  may  be  stated  in  per  unit  terms  or  in  ad
valorem terms.  It  may be a flat rate,  or it may be graduated  according  to price, size
or quality  of deposit,  etc.  Production  taxes  may  allow sonic  costs  to  be  deducted
from them.  In the simplest  case, currenit or operating  costs may be deducted.  More
generally,  the tax  can be a  profit tax in  which both  capital  costs  and  current  costs
are  deductible.  The  tax  treatment  of capital  costs  is  an  important  characteristic
of resource  taxes  since  resource  industries  tend  to  be  relatively  capital-intensive.
Capital  costs  may include  depreciation  of installed  capital,  intercst  costs  and  de-
pletion  allowances.  There  may also be incentives for certain  types  of activities  such
exploration,  developmnent and  further  processing.  A variation  on profits taxation  is
the  so-called  rate-of-return tax %hich is a  tax levied oII rates  of return  in excess  of
a  cut-off rate.
Another  very  important  variant  of profits  taxation  is the  so-called  cash flow
tax.  The  base for this  tax  is the real cash  flows of the firm defined to be  total  cash
(as opposed  to accrued)  revenues from  the sale of output  less total  cash  outlays  on
both  current  and  capital  inputs  as  they  occur.  The  full and  immediate  write-off
of all  investment  expenses  implies  that  there  is no need  for costing  capital  on an
accrual  basis  using  depreciation  and  cost  of capital  deductions.  Nor is there  any
need  for  indexing.  Under  this  form  of  a  cash  flow tax,  only  real  as  opposed  to
financial  transactions  have  tax  implications.  It  is what  the  Meade  Report  (1978)
referred  to as an  R-based  cash flow tax.  It  would also be possible  to  treat  financial
3purchases  and sales on a cash flow basis, and  there may be some merit  from doing so
in  industries  in which  significant  profits  are generated  from  finanicial transactions,
sulch as in financial  interrnediation.  However, in  discuissirng  the  cash flow tax  in the
context  of the  resource  industries,  our  focius will be  on the  real  side  of the  firm.
There  are  very  few instances  of a pure  cash  flow tax,  though  some  counitries  use
partial  variants  of it.  One important  reason  is the fact that,  under  a cash flow tax,
firms  undertaking  expansionary  investments  will typically  b)e in a  loss p)osition  with
negative  tax  lial)ilities.  Symmetric  treatment  woul(l require  that  the  governiiment
mnake  good  these negative  taxes,  b)ut this  is rarely  done.  That  is, f7ill loss offsetting
is not  the  rule.
This  problem  of the tax  treatment  of losses is a more general  onie that  applies
to  any  sort  of  tax  allowing  deductioins  for  costs.  It  will l)e of some  importance
in  our  discussion  of resource  tax  policy.  Typically,  tax  systemns allow partial  lo.9s
offsetting  of the  following type.  Firms  in  a  loss positioIl  are  allowed to  carry  the
losses backward  for a given number  of years  and forward for a given number  of years
without  interest.  If special  investinent  incentives  are in  place,  the  ability  to  offset
losses may  be affected.  For example,  if countries  offer a  tax  holiday  in  whicli zero
taxes  are  payable,  firms  may be  preclude(d from  carrying  forwar(d losses into  years
in  which  the  tax  rate  is positive.  Naturally,  the  problem  of loss offsetting  is only
relevant  under  tax  systems  in which deductions  for costs are allowed from  the base.
Prodllction  or output  tax bases  could not  be negative.
In ixiany cou.ntries, resource products  are trade(d on international  markets.  This
gives rise  to  tra(le  taxes  as a forrmi  of revenue  raising.  In  the  case of an  exporting
couIntry,  anl  export  talx  caii  be  use(.  Its  effects  will  differ from  a  source-l)ased
production  tax  since  (loiiiestic consumnption of the  resource  is excluded  from  tax-
ation.  Siiilarly,  resource-importing  couintries imay employ  tariffs  on resourcc  irii-
ports.  Equivalent  ineasures  such as quotas  and( licenses can  )e uised iri lieu of trade
taxes,  although  their  reventues mnay  accruel to  the  p)rivate rather  than  the  publ)lic
se(2(  t or.
There  are  various  noni-tax mneaslures  thait could be  undertake n  by the  govern-
inent  to  divert  revenues  froml the  resource  inrduistries to  the  p)ublic sector.  Thefse
typically  involvc the  direct  exercise  of prop)erty rights  by  the  public  sector.  One
C(omMo form  tllis  takes is the  sale of leases frorn the  pubulic  sector  to  the  private
sector  for  the  exploitation  of a  partic2xlar  resource.  This  is  conurnron  in  the  oil  an(l
gas  industry.  in  forestry.  in  the  fishery  ai(i  in  nilling  industries.  The  sale  often
takes  the  form  of an  auction  in  which  competing  bids  are  tendered.  The  auction
itself  rnay take  variotus  foriis.  including  both  sealed  aid(i open  bidding.  Dep)en(ling
on  the  resource.  the  lease  mnay involve  the  righlt  to  explore  (as  in  oil  and  gas)  or
the  riglit  to  extract  a kiowii  source  of resource  (as  in  forests  an(n fislidig  groun(ls).
The  termns of leases imay vary  as well.  An  important  elemjent  of a  lease  rixay b)( thhe
4time  period  over which it  applies.  The length  of the lease or concession  may affect
the  speed  with  which  a  nonrenewable  resource  is  extracted  as well as  the  way in
which  a  renewable  resourct, is nlariage(l.  OInly a lease of indefinite  d(trationl would
be  equivalent  to  full private  ownersllii) of the  resource  l)roperty.  Note  that  there
may  be an  interaction  between  the  leasing  systerm and( the  sub)sequent  taxation  if
the  p)rofits fromii  the  resource.  The  purchase  of a lease is an  acquisition  cost  whichl
is  typically  treated  as  a  cost  deductible  froIm the  tax  l)ase.  AnI alternative  would
be  for  the  lease  to  be  creditable  against  tax  liabilities.  The  relationship  l)etwec
leases  aLnd  p)rofits taxes will be discussed  further  below.  A related  rueasixre that  can
be  use(i is licensing.  Frmns canl be  reqluire(l to l)ay a license fee to  exp)loit resource
properties.  Depending  on  lhow licenses  are  allotted  andl how their  p)rices are  set,
they  can have very sirnilar  effects to leases.
Direct  public  sector  participation  in  resource  production  is  another  way  of
obtaining  a  share  of revenues  from  resources.  This  cari  take  the  form  of joint
ventures  in  which  the  public  sector  puts  ui) a  certain  share  of  the  capital  to  full
public  ownership.  This  bears  somne  analogy  with  cash flow taxation.  As we discuss
later,  cash flow taxatioln has the effect of mraking the governimenlt  a  silent  partner  inI
the ownership  and profits  of the firm.  Public share ownership  makes the government
an active  I)artner.  As long as the governmlent is not in a positioII to exercise  control
of the  firm,  the  results  should  be  sirnilar,  with  one major  exception.  For firrmis  in
a loss position,  public share  purchases  will be like cash flow taxation  with  fuill loss
offsetting.  It  will therefol  dliffer  in effect froii  cash flow taxation  with  only partial
loss  offsetting.
The  public  sector  mlay also  engage  in  regulatory  activities  which  affect  the
behaviouir  of resource  firins  without  generating  any  revenues  for the  pub)lic sector.
Various  aspects  of the  resouirce firm's  b)ehaviour  inay  be regulated,  fromIi  exploration
to  dlevelopment  through  to  extraction.  In  addition  to  havinig the  disadvantage  of
Iiot  generating  revenUes  for the publ)hlic  sector,  regulation  is also a discretionary  forrn
of intervention  which  c'aII indluce  inter-firmi  ohistortioIs  oin the  economly.
Before leving  this  introductory  se(tioin,  there  are three  further  instituitiornal
features  of the  resource  ind(uistries which  are worth  highlighting.  Trhe first  is that
there  is often  a  significant  presence  of foreign-owned  firms  in  the  resou.rce sector.
espe cially in developing countries.  The tax treatment  of such firmns  hoth  by the host
coulntry and  by its  home government  is an important  determinant  of the  incentive
to invest in  the former.  Typically,  a foreign firm is liable for taxation  both  at  home
and  in  the  host  country.  However.  there  mlay he  rTieasuires in  place  to  reduce  the
possibility  of double  taxation.  Corporate  tax  systems  typically  offer  partial  tax
credits  oIn simnilar taxes  paid  abroad.  Thus.  the  United  States  taxes  the  profits
of foreign  subsi(liaries  of its  domestic  firms  when  profit  arc  repatriated  and  offers
a  tax  credit  ii1) to  the  amoulnt  of home  country  tax  liabilities.  Sinilar  practic(es
5are applied  elsewhere.  Resource  taxes may not  be  creditable  against  horne  country
taxes,  in  which  case they  may serve  to  discourage  investmenit in  the  host  country.
This  rnay be important  in designing  the  tax system  to  apply  to resources.
A second institutional  feature  of resource taxatioII is that,  in federal  economies,
jurisdiction  over resources  may  be  divided  between  two levels of governmenit.  For
exarmple, general  taxes  such  as corporate  taxes  rmiay  be  levied  by the  central  level
of  government,  while  special  resource  taxes  inay  be  applied  at  a  lower  level  of
government.  This  cormplicates the  tax  systerm considerably.
Fiiially,  resource  exploitatiorl  may  givc rise  to  environmental  costs  of various
sorts.  These costs mnay  be external  to the resource firmi itself.  If so, special rmeasures
may have to be taken  to ensure  that  the external  costs imposed  on the environment
are taken  into consideration  by the firm in its  decision-irlaking.
6II.  THE  GOALS  OF  RESOURCE  TAXATION
As  meDtioned,  go iernments  typically  tax  resource  industries  over and  above other
industries,  often with  special  taxes  applying  on resources  alone.  In this  Section,  we
consider  the  reasons  for this  practice.  The  mnost  important  objective  of resource
taxation  is to obtain  some share  of the rents  for the public  sector.  We begin  with1  a
discussion  of the concept  of resource rents  and  then  turn  to a the  reasons for taxing
resources,  one of which is to obtain  a share  of the  rents  for the  public  sector.
1.  The  Concept  of  Resource  Rents
One  of the  key  characteristics  of natrural  resources  is the  fact  that  they  generate
economric rents.  The  rent  of a  stoc..  c;  resource  is simply  its  ultirnate  economic
value,  or  the  economic  profit from  its  exploitation.  More  specifically,  the  flow of
rent  from  a  given  amount  of  resource  is  the  difference  between  the  real  accrued
revenues  it  generates  and  all real  accrued  costs  of obtaining  those  revenues.  It  is
useful  to distinguish  non-renewable  from  renewable  resource  rents.
a.  Non-Renewable  Resource  Rents
For a non-renewable  resource  such as a mine, the  accrued  revenues result  frorn the
final  sale of the  mineral  to  a user.  The  accrued  costs include  all the  current  and
capital  costs  associated  with  exploring  for the  mineral,  developing  the  mine  site,
extracting  the  ore,  and1  processing  it  to obtain  the  mineral  in usable  form.
Revenues  and  current  costs  are conceptually  quite  easy  to  account  for on  an
accrual  basis.  Revenues include  the sale value of the resource  when the  transaction
occurs  independent  of when  cash  actually  changes  hand.  Accrued  revenues  will
differ from cash receipts  by accounts  receivable.  The saimne  applies for current  inputs.
Their  accrued  costs  differ frorn cash  costs  by accounts  payable.  The valuation  of
accrued  revenues  and costs should be at  their value at the time of transaction  rather
than  actual  cash  receipts  or disbursements.  These  will differ typically  by implicit
interest  costs.  This  makes exact  mreasuiernent difficult.
Capital  costs  are  even more  difficult to  impute  since all  capital  expenditures
must  be  appropriately  capitalized.  Thus.  the  cost  of using  depreciable  assets  in-
cludes  three  components  --  true  depreciation  of the  asset,  the  real  financial  costs
of holding  the  asset  whether  the financing  be by debt  or retained  earnings  or new
equity,  and  any  real  capital  losses resulting  from  changes  in  the  replacement  cost
of holding  the  asset.  All of these  are difficult,  if not  impossible,  to  measure  since
they  require  one to know the true  rate  of depreciation  of the asset.  For a depletable
asset,  similar  components  should be included  as costs,  but  in this  case depreciation
7is replaced  l)y (lepletion of the  asset  through  exploitation.  Note  that  the  acquisi-
tioii  eost  of  the  dep)letal)le  asset  here  includes  the  purllchase  p)ri(e  of  any  lease  or
proI)prty  rights  as  well  as  exploration  an(I  d(eVelop)ment expenises.  These  iritist  be
ca)italized  apl))rop)riately  as  al)ove.  Any  lhol(iing of inventories  of goods  in  p)rocess
or  firlal  pro(luct  Illust  also  be  accounteild  for  oni an  accrual  l)asis.  The  cost  of  ulsilig
inv;mtories  iticlidles  the  replac  mient  cost  (f  the  inventory  when  used  plus  the  real
cost  of  llol(lilig  the  inventorie'S  inichi(linig hothi  fLiaticial  andol storage  costs.  Notice
that  if  current  inl)uts  are  used  to  p-oduce  inventories,  they  sliotilol( iiOt b)e treated
as  a  cost  Uniitil  the  inventory  is use(l  to  produce  rv(enues.
Finally,  mininig  activities  involve  sonie  risk  and(i  the  fuill costs  of  risk-takinig
sh0otil(d be  taken  inlto  accouit.  There  are  various  sorts  of  risk  inivolve(l.  In  the
exploration  stage.  there  is the  risk  associated  witl  riot  knowinig  wlhat size of deposit
will  be  found,  There  is  a  risk  associated  with  future  changes  in  the  price  of inputts
(capital  andI labour)  required  to  exploit  the  mine.  And,  there  is the  risk  associated
with  ulncertairnty  al)out  the  final  price  of  thie miniierail whCII it  is  eventually  sold.
The  measurement  of the  cost  of risk-taking  is riot  simple  since  it  depernds upon  the
extent  to which  risks  can  b)e pooled  oni cal)ital  niarkets.  Thlls,  if capital  markets  were
perfect,  the  onily risk  that  need  be  a  concern  is the  norl-diversifiable  risk  associited
with  the  iminling  activity.  In  l)rincil)le. this  component  of risk  Tlay  be observable  as
the  beta  Cc(fjticjciat in  eImp)irical cap)ital  asset  pricinig  mo(dls.
b.  Renieable  II  so  Rc ni.ts
Simiiilar p)rinciles)1  ap)p)ly to  a  relewal)l(  resource.  thlioigl  the  emlp)hasis  will  differ
soiriewlat.  Agailn.  tlIe  ec(  onoTuciC  ren1t from  a  re newable  resource  like  a  forest  or  a
fishlinlg;  gro  lll(l will  he the  flow of accrtui d  revenues  less  thle flow of all  accrued  costs
on  a  real  b)asis.  Accounting  foI  revennes  receive(l  and( for  current  inpuits  used  to
lprodle  revenues  is  sirmiilar to  the  case  of non-renewable  resources.  Capital  costs
are  somewhat  different  in  nature.  Any  depreciable  assets  iISe(l in  exploiting  the
renewab)le  resource  arc  treate(d  as  above.  HOW(eV(e,v.  the  asset  associated  with  the
reniewal)le  resource  itself  is quite  different  fromn a  stock  of  ncn-renewable  resource.
UIilike  witli  the  formier.  there  will typically  be 110 exploration  costs  associated  with
discovering  it.  And(. since  it  is renewable.  it  regernerates  itself  over  tiunie.
Cdnside r  a  fishlinig grolii(i  as  an  example.  The  evolution  of  the  stock  of  fish
throuigh  time  depen(ds  jointly  u1pon the  biological  growthi  rate  of  the  stock  (which
itself  typically  deperpds  ll)pon  the  stock)  and( the  rat*  at  which  fish  are  taken  froimi
the  fishlinig gi-mind.  There  is  usually  iio  reso mrce  costi involved  with  this  b)iological
process  (although  fishi farimis may  use  restocking  techniques).  The  opportunity  cost
of  taking  a(l(ditional  fish  froni  the  fislinlg  ground  at  a  point  in  time  is  the  present
valuhe  of  the  foregolne flow of fislh that  rlo.el]  tS  ili  thle fitlire.  This  is obviously  a
8difficult  thinrg  to  account  for.  It  p)resumIes, for  example,  a  particular  patternl  of
behaviotur  into  the  fature,  ideally  optimal  behaviour.  A simiilar accouniting  (lifficulty
arises  with  a  forest,  except  here  there  is  the  additional  corliplication  that  costs  of
reforestation  imiust b)e taken  into  account.  As  witlh  the  fishinig  grounid,  thelr  is  a
natural  growth  rate  Of  trees, so the stock of trees depends jointly  upon  the frequency
of cutting  and(i the  growth  pattern of the  s)pecies of  trees.  Tl1us the  op)portuini  ty
cost  of additional  cutting  can 1)e treatd(l  as the  cost of rle)lantiIig  pluis the prcselnt
value  of  the  change  in  the  value  of trees  harvested  into  the  future.  Again,  this
is  a  difficult  thinig  to  ineasure.  Finally,  the  property  used  fol  renewable  resolurce
exl)loitation  Iliay  have  an  alte'rnative  use  ill  which  case  thlat  slio01(i  l)(e  )aprt  of  the
opportunity  cost of obtaining  the resource.  For exaniple, iii the case, of a forest,  tlhei
land  miay have  a site  value  independent  of its  use  for  p)lantinlg trees.  The  cap)italized
value  of  the  land(i ought  to  b)e part  of the  ongoing  cost  of op)erating  the  forest.
The  aniount  of renit  that  a  given  resource  will generate  depends  upon  the  be-
haviour  of the  agent  responsible  for  exploiting  the  resource.  The  agent's  behaviour.
in  turn,  depends  uponi  the  instituitiornal  setting,  including  the  way in  which  p)roperty
rights  are  defined,  the  efficiency  of capital  inarkets,  amid  the  tax  or regulatory  systemi
inI place.  The  lbasic p)resuml)tioIl  is that  p)rivate  sector  operators  will  inaximnize  the
present  value  of  after-tax  economnic  profits  (rents)  over  the  appl)hicable  timne horizor.
If  private  ownership  is absolute,  the  time  horizoni  will  be  the  indefinite  future.  We
will  refer  to  the  valuc  of rents  generated  by  p)rivate  optimizing  b)ehlavioulr as  priiatc
rent.s.  They  may  (liffer  froml social  rents.  which  are  the  rents  attainab)le  fromi  the
resource  from  s(ci ety's point  of view.  Private  renits xxiay differ fromii  social renits for
a  variety  of  reasons.  If taxes  apply  oni the  firimi. they  are  p)art  of  the  social  return,
biUt not of the  private  returil.  If the activities  of the  firmii  generates  external  costs.
such  as  degradation  of  the  envirotiment.  these  will  forimi  p)art  of  social  costs  lbut  nlot
private  costs.  If  the  tinme  lhorizoni  of  the  private  sector  is  limited  by  inistittutionial
coIIstrainlt,  thet ieitasureiment  of rents  fromii  a  )rivate  point  of view  will differ  fromli
that  for  society.  Furthermliorc,  potential  social  rents  imay  well  dliffer  substantially
fromII  actual  social  rents  generated  iiy thle exploitationI of a resource.  All of the above
distortionis  can  giv  ris  to  a  pattern  of explloitation  which  is sub-optimal  fromn  a
social  point  of view.  One of' ouir pnurposes  later onl  in t his sti (ly is to  coIIsider witli
more precision ihow  various  taxes im-pinge upon thc lbhaviour of resource,  mianagers.
Naturally.  the  amounit of rent  thlat  can  be  genrated  fromii a  itreiewale  or  nonI-
renewable  resource  depends upon tlic  features  of the  resource  iii (ulestion.  Mines
with  higher  (Iiality ores will generate  higher  rents.  Resources  wvlichi are found  in
isolate(d  locations  will  l)e costlier  to  exploit  and(I will generate  lower  rc  ts.  RB  emits will
also  vary  withi tHie  stock of a resource.  F' r any  giv(lle  r(isMUree.  we call I liiik of therel
b)eing a spectrum  of low remit  to higih rent  sto cks raig,i ng frorti negative  to positivC.
Onily those  resource  stocks  witli  miomi-  negatiVe  rI'llts  will  lt  WI rthi  eXp)loiting.  Thousc
resou.rce  stocks  for  whuichi ren  ts  are  zero  will  1h  reifcrr( d  to  ajS M'(17(1777(11  Z  H._Al) 17
9stocks.  Those  with  positive  rents  will be  called  inframarginal.  The  location  of the
marginal  resource  stock  along the spectrum  will also depend  upon  the  *,istittutional
setting.  For example,  if the  tax  system  impinges  upon  the  marginal  resource,  it
will Inake the  after-tax  rent  negative  and  another  resource deposit  will becorme the
marginal  one.  Much  of our  later  analysis  will consider  precisely  the  issue  of how
the  tax  system  affects  the marginal  resource  stock.
We have  noted  a  several  points  that  the  measurement  of rents  is  a  difficult
thing,  both  conceptually  and  practically.  This  is because  all  accounting  is on  an
accrual  basis and in real termris,  and many of the costs that  rnust be impute(d are not
observable  and  therefore  hard  to measure.  This  would seem to inake  the concept  of
rents  virtually  impossible  to  use for any  policy  purposes  and,  as we shall see,  that
would be very unfortunate.  The concept  of rents  as defined above is an economically
attractive  one since it measure the flow of the contributior.  the resource mnakes  to real
economic output  at  aily point  in tirne as an economist  would see it.  However, there
is an  alternative  measure  which gives the same present  value of economic rents  but
a  different  time  pattern.  That  is the  cash flow.  It  consists  simply of the  difference
between  all  cash  receipts  from  the  sale of output  less  cash  expenditures  for  both
current  and  capital  inputs.  Because  capital  costs  are not  capitalized,  costs  occur
much earlier  in  time  than  under  an  accrual  accounting  system.  Thus,  the  pattern
of cash  flows is typically  lower earlier on and'higher  later  thanl for econormic profits.
However, in  present  value terms,  cash flow is the same as economic  profits.  It  also
has  the  advantage  of being  much easier  to  measure  than  economic profits  since all
items  are, in  principle,  observable.  There  is no need to measure  imputed  costs,  nor
is there  any need  to index.  The concept  of cash flow will play an important  part  in
our  analysis  of tax  policy options  and  we discuss it in rnore detail  below.
One  final irmportant  property  of the  concept  of econornic  rent  should  be men-
tioned  before  turning  to  tax  issues.  Since rent  reflects  the  present  value  of  the
economic  profits  that  a  resource is expected  to  generate  into  the  future,  the  value
of the  resource  stock  in question  should  be) precisely  the present  value of its  future
rents.  That  is, future  rents  are said  to be  capitalized into  the  value of the  resource.
Because  this  is so, any  tax  changes that  affect  the  value of rents  in the  future  will
be  inmmediately capitalized  into  the  current  value of the  resource.  In  that  sense,
current  resource  owners bear  future  expected  resource  taxes.
2.  Reasons  for  Taxing  Resource  Industries
Given  the  different  types  of resource taxes use(d in practice,  it is not  surprising  that
there  rmay be  differing motives  for taxing  them.  We present  here  a non-exhaustive
list of somne  of the  reasons  for taxing  resources  in general  and  for the  specific types
of taxes  somnetimies  used.
10a. Rent  Collection
The rnain justification  for taxing resource firms is to  obtain a share of the  rents
for the public sector.  Fromn  a tax policy point of view, the taxation  of rents is an
ideal source of revenue since a rent tax is non-distorting (i.e., efficient) if desigrned
properly. By definition, rents are the net value of the resource aIi(l do nct  represent
the returni to any variable factor of production.  Since the objvctive of a firrn will be
to maximize the present value of rents, a proportionlal tax on rents will not affect
the choices of the firm. Maxirriizinrg  pre-tax  rents will call for the samle  behaviour
as maximizing a given proportion of pre-tax rents.
The equity properties of taxing rents are not as clearcut.  For one thing,  the
ownership of rents are riot necessarily correlated with a characteristic of taxpayers
deemed worthy of special taxation  on equity grounds.  Furtlhermiiore,  as mentioned
above, taxes on rents can get capitalized into current values and thus effectively be
incident on current owners. This is questionable on equity grounds.
b.  Capital Income Taxation
It  may be desirable to  tax  resource industries as part  of the  general taxation  of
capital  income iri an economy. In this case, capital income can  be thought of as
including both  the normal return  to capital plus rents.  The task of taxing capital
incoxne falls jointly upon the corporate income tax  and personal income taxation.
In these systems, capital income on debt tends to be taxed primarily at the personal
level. The corporate tax is usually levied on equity capital income, which includes
rent.  Special measures rnight be applied to resource industries as a way of ensuring
that  rents are included properly in the base.
z. Industrial Policy
The design of the  tax  system as it  applies to  resources may be chosen so as to
achieve certain objectives of industrial policy suich  as the encouragement of further
processing of resources or the maintenance of sorme  inimuirim  level of activity  for
skrategic reasons. This is more often a reason for encouraginig  the activity through
subsidization than  the taxing of it to obtain revenues.
d. Risk Pooling and Financing
As mentioned earlier, taxation  of resources can be analogous to the  public sector
becorning a silent partner  in  the firm.  The deductibility of costs combirned  with
the taxation  of revenues is like the acquisition of new equity for the firm. This can
be advantageous for the firrm  in a couple of ways if capital markets are imperfect.
For one, if the governiment  is better  able to pool risks than  the firm, the taxation
of resource profits can encourage risk-taking and be socially beneficial. Also, the
11taxation  system  can  serve  to  improve  cash  flows  in  perio(ls  of  expansion  thereby
assistirng  firrIs  which  have  liquiidity  prob)lemns because  of  diffihcuties  in  ob.'aiing
otitsi(le finance.  The  effectiveriess  of  the  tax  systein  for  these  purposes  depends
upon  the  firmii being  able  to  t, ke  full  tax  advantage  of  deductible  costs.  In  the
absence  of fulll loss offsetting,  that  will not  be  the  case.
(!.  Thc  Iaxation  of Forciqner.s
If foreigners  own  resources  in  the  country,  the  ability  to  extract  tax  revenutes  froil
the.ln  will  provide  ani a(d(litional  incentive  for  taxationi.  Thlere  are  two  sorts  of
circumstances  in  which  taxes  iiiay  be  obtained  from11  foreigners.  The first  is  when
the  tax  applies  onl rents,  ill which  case  the  inotivatioii is exactly  as in  a.  above.  The
seconrd is to  exploit  foreign  tax  crediting  arrangements.  If foreign  governmients  offer
tax  credits  on  investments  imade abroad,  it  is  in  the  interest  of  host  countries  to
tax  the  firmn up) to  the  limit  of the  credit.  This  can  significantly  affect  time  desigfl  of
the  tax  systenm and  the  level  of taxation.  In  the  absence  of crediting  arrangemients,
any  attempt  to  tax  capital  incomlie of foreigners  will  not  succeed  if  the  coulltry  is  a
price-taker  in  internatioinal  capital  markets.  The  tax  will simply  be  shifted  ba(ck to
non-ca)ital  factors  in  the  host  couintry.
f.  Ezercizse Monopoly  Powr￿sr  in  World Marketsz
SomIe countries  miay be imiportaInt  enuigh  sup)liers  of a  resource  on  worl(d mrarkets
that  they  are  able  to  influence  its  price.  One  way  of exxploiting  this  p)ower is  to  use
tax  policy.  In  this  case,  the  a)p)ropriate  tax  woil(d  p)resurnably  be  an  export  tax.
Alternatively,  p)ublic  participation  iiay  serve  to  monopolize  the  sale  of the  resource
(lirectly.
g.  Concsrvation  of  Re.so'irces
Finally,  tax  policy  ilay  be used  as a  way of inducing  firmls to  tax  account  of external
factors  in  their  resource  management  d(ecisions.  Production  taxes  rnay )e use(d to
redluce  the  rate  of exploitation  of resources  for  social  reasons.  The  latter  may  include
environmental  costs  which  dep)end uporn thc  rate  of extraction  or  equity  concerns
for  futuire  generations.
As  mentioned,  of  all  these  reasons  for  taxinig  resources,  that  of  capturing  a
share  of rents  for  the  public  sector  is by far  the  (lolnianrt  one.  The  next  seCCtio0n
is  devoted  to  issues  arising  from  the  attempt  by  the  public  sector  to  tax  the  rents
accruling  oIn natulral  resources.
12III.  PRINCIPLES  OF  TAXING  RESOtJRCE  RENTS
There  is a  large  literature  in  p)alblic finance  concerned  with  the  dlesign  of  a  ta:  on
pule  profits  or  rents.  Indeed,  nmuch of the  theoretical  literature  oll  the  corporate
t  az has  address('dl precisely  that  issue.  Most of the analysis  has coicerned  ecollornic
profits  in genreral without  specific reference to the  rcsource industries,  tlhat is, witlh-
otit spec.  ying  the  source  of rents.  A  firmn is siniply  assiliiied  to  have  a  decreasing
returns  to  scale  (i.e.,  strictly  concave)  pro(du(ctiorn furnction  involviing  a  current  input
an(l  a  dep)£(!ciahlv capital  inlp)ult.  Part  of the  puiirpose of this  section  is  to  apply  the
results  of  this  tiLalysis  explicitiy  to  the  resource  industries  where  the  rents  arise
because  of a given  aniiouniit of natural  resource,  reInewal)le or  otherwise.  Altlhoulgh
the  general  princi)les  of taxing  rents  remrain intact  whatever  the  source  of the  rents,
sorme special  issues  apply  in  the  case  of resources  whiclh affect  the  design  of revenue-
raising  inecthanismis.  It  is  useful  to  begin  witli  a  discussion  of sorne  general  issues
that  arise  in  the  taxatioi-  of resource  rents  blefore  turninig  to  specific  miiechailisrms.
1.  Some  General  Issues
As  wc  will  see  below,  the  p)Ii1cipies  of  designinlg  a  proper  rerit  tax  in  the  ideal
world often  used  by econornists  are  fairly  straightforwar(d  and  can  take  a  variety
of alternative  forms.  However, in  attecript.,ig  to  apply  thlis ini  practice  to  the  re-
source  indlustries,  several  concep)tual probleilms  caan  arise.  It  is useful  to  begin  with
a list  of sornie of these  conceptual  prol)lenlis as a preludie to considerirng the  various
iriecharisrris.
a.  Ex  Ante  tvcr7%sv_s  Ez  Po,ost  Rent  Taxatiorn
A stock  of resouirces will yield  a flow of rents  over  timre. In the  case of renewable
resources.  this  flow can  go on  indefinitely,  while for  non-renewable  resources  the
flows  call  only  Sumlll  ulp to  the  given  stock.  Rent  tax ition  can  be  designed  so  as  to
(divert a shale  of the  rents  to  the  public  sector  frorn the  private  sector  after  they
accrue.  This  is  referred  to  as  r.z post  rent  taxation.  O(n the  rother  hand,  as  will
be  seen later,  some rent  tax  rnechanismns  ta'.e  a share  of the rents  before  the  rents
actually  accrue.  This  is ex ante rernt taxatioI.  In principle.  ex po.st and  ex  ante rent
taxation  can  bel designe(i  to yield  equivalent  revenues  in  present  value  terms,  and
part  of the literature  is devoted to ensuring  that  the base of the rent  tax is equivalent
in  preseit  value  termns to  the  flow of accrued  rents  thermselves.  Economnists have
tended  to  view  these  taxes  as  having  the  saime efficiency  p)roperties  as  actual  rent
taxes  and  have advocated  their  use.  Sorme of themn  are attractive  precisely  because
tl.ey  are  easier  to  iinpleincint thani accrued  rent  taxes.  The  flip side of this  is that
whatever  the  rent  tax  collected,  only  its  p)resent value counts  anyway  since future
13taxes  should  be  capitalized  into  the  value of the  resource property.
However,  the  very fact  that  the  public  sector  can apparenitly  choose  the  timie
patterni  of rent  tax  revenues  gives rise  to  a couple of funtdarmiental  problerns  which
are related  to one  another.  The first  is that  governments  can chalnge tax  rates  at
will over time  as circumstances  change.  Thlls, there  will be sortme  uncertainty  about
future  tax  liabilities  on this  account  aloine, III a  sense,  this  woul(l argue  in favour
of a tax  base in which  tax liabilities  are incurred  as u) front  as possible.  Theiri  the
consequence  of possible  tax cihanges later  on will be less sirnce the base will be lower
then.
Related  to this is the fact that  there  is a fundamental  time  inconsistency  prob-
lem  inherent  in  the  taxation  of natural  resources.  Once  a  resource  property  is
acquired  either  through  outright  purchase of the rights to a known stock or by incur-
ring  exploration  and  development  expenditures,  governments  have  an incerntive to
tax  the stock  fully. If they  could cornmit  to a predetermined  tax policy, they  might
choose  a policy which induces  the optimal  amouat  of exploration,  developnient  and
renewal.  However, such commitmnent is not  possible.  Since private  operators  know
that  such comrmiitment is impossible,  they will adjust  their  behaviour  in anticipation
of future  government  tax  policies.  The  result  is inefficient  behaviour.  This  seerns
to be  an  unavoidable  problem.
It is one that  also applies to foreign investors.  If host  goveriinents  could comrmit
themnselves to  future  policies,  b)oth taxation  and  expropriation,  they  could  choose
their policies  to attract  the mrost efficient level of foreign investment.  However, once
the  foreigin investment  is in place,  it  becormes a fixed factor  which  is a good  target
for taxation.  Foreigr. investors  will anticip)ate this  and  act  accordingly.  The  result
will be  a sub-optimial level of investment.
b.  Problems  of Measuring  Rents
We  have  already  ma(le  sorne  reference  to  the  fact  that  rents  are  virtually  impos-
sible  to  measulre  as  they  accrue.  To  do  so  requires  being  able  to  measure  accrued
real  capital  costs  accuratcly.  including  real  depreciation,  real  costs  of financing,  real
capital  losses,  replacement  cost  of  inventories,  thie cost  of  risk-bearing,  etc.  Spe-
cial  problemns  arise  in  the  resource  induistries,  both  renewable  and  non-renewable.
In  the  case  of  renewable  resources,  there  mnay be  costs  associated  with  using  the
resource  property  for  resource  extraction  as opposed  to  sorle  other  use  (e.g.,  recre-
ation.  farminlg)  and( this  must  be  accounted  for.  The  cost  associated  with  current
extraction  itself  is  a  particularly  difficult  concept.  In  principle,  the  opportunity
cost  of increaseld  current  extraction.  is postponed  futuire  extraction.  Given  that  the
dynamics  of  extraction  is  itself  liable  to  be  rather  complicated.  this  opportunity
14eost  is difficlllt to liwaslirc.  Siiiiil.arly, replenishln(ent or renewal costs are difficult to
mneasure  oll  an  accrutals  basis  since  they  sholuld  be  irnputed  to  the  period  at  which
the resource  is eventually  extracted.
Similar  problems  arise  with  non-renewable  resources.  The  costs  of extraction
are  somewhat  simpler  to  account  for  since  they  are  simply  the  value  of the  resource
currently  extracted,  it  being  no  longer  available  for  use.  However,  exploration  anl(
developmient  costs  should  be  capitalized  as  should  any  resource  acquisition  costs.
This  gives  rise  to  problems  not  unlike  the  measurement  of capital  depreciation  costs.
c.  Monitoring  and  Implementation  Problems
All tax  systems  are  subject  to  enforcement  problems,  especially  those  administered
on  a  self-assessment  basis.  Resource  taxes  would  not  be  immunune  to  this;  in  fact,
such  problems  may  be  more  severe  in  the  resource  industries  if  additional  taxes  are
to be imposed.  Problems  can arise both  through  outright  evasion or through  avoid-
ance.  Evasion  is an  illegal activity  which involves deliberately  under-reporting  tax
liabilities.  Given  the  fact  that  firms  cannot  be  perfectly  monitored,  it  is impossible
to  eliminate  evasion  entirely.  Its  incidence  can  be  reduced  by  increasing  resources
devoted  to  auditing  and  by  increasing  the  penalty  for  being  detected.  Of  course,  if
administrative  corruption  is  present,  evasion  becomes  more  difficult  to  control.
Avoidance  refers  to  the  reduction  of tax  liabilities  by  undertaking  measures  to
divert  revenues  and  costs  among  activities.  Unlike  with  evasion,  under-reporting  is
not  involved.  However,  the  rncans  of reporting  certain  items  rnay  be  affected.  There
are  various  ways  of doing  this.  One is by the  use  of transfer  pricing.  Transfer  pricing
is a  phenornenon  that  occurs  primarily  in  vertically-integrated  firms  in  which  sales
from  one  to  another  are  not  done  at  arm's  length.  Profits  are  diverted  from  high-
to  low-taxed  firms  or  activities  by  changing  the  price  that  is charged  inl intra-firlll
transactions.  Thus,  if a  resource  firm  is also  involved  in  downstream  processing,  it
may  be  able  to  avoid  part  of any  special  resource  tax  imposed  upon  it by  arranging
to  sell its  resource  outpuit  to  the  processing  firm  at  artificially  reduced  prices  thereby
taking  more  of its  profit  in  the  upstream  firm.  As  well  as  shifting  profits  through
transfer  pricing,  financial  transacbions  can  also  be  used.  For  example,  if interest
is  deductible,  firms  can  arrange  to  do  their  borrowing  through  the  firm  with  the
highest  tax  rate  thereby  reducing  their  overall  tax  burden.  Again,  resource  firms
may  be particularly  susceptible  to these  practices  since  they  may  face extra  taxation.
Finally,  firms  can  rearrange  their  overhead  and  adnministrative costs  by changes  in
marketing,  head  offices, research  and  development,  and  so on.
A final  technique  for avoiding  taxes  is to  make  masquerade  profits  as  costs.
This  is  a  particular  problem  with  cash  flow types  of taxes.  Closely-held  firms  can
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flows  appear  smaller  andi redlucing  taxes  based  oII cash  flows.  Thiis can  be  aln issuie
ill the  desigin  of  taxes  based  oni  cash  flows.
cd. Re/labton  'cn',Ih  Oth,cr  Iaxe.(11
Rcso(rce  t aXes  will  typically  be  part  of  a  11(ore general  businless  tax  System  which
ilc  hli(leS  (cor)(o)ration  illnco  m)eI t(axationi  as  Well  as  perso(nal  taxatic)n.  Tlhe  isslue  then
arises  as  to  whet  her  I  ()1i  typ(  of  tax  liab)ility  Shocu)lld  be  (de(dlulte(I  against  the  tax
l)ase or  credlitedl against  the  tax  liablilitics  of allot her.  In tlihe case  of  corp)orate  all(l
personal  taxes,  there  is  a  strong  argunicent  in  favouir  of  integrating  the  two  systemls
by  giving  somIe  sort  of  credlit  at  the  plersoInal  1(V(e  l  for  taxes  ha  Lvinlg  been  paid  by
corlporations.  This  is  usually  (donle by  Ineatis  of  a  dividend  tatx  cre(lit  administered
at  the  ipersonial  level.  This reflects  the  fiact  that  the  corporate  tax  is  intenoded  essenI-
tially  as  a  withholding  (evice  against  (loecstic  tax  lial)ilities  for  personal  taxation.
However,  resource  talxatioi  is  intended  to  be  anl additional  source  of  tax  burden
over  an(i  al)ove  income  taxation.  Tlhuis. crediting  it.  or  eV(n  allowing  a  (leleduction
for  it  against  corl)orate  taxes  is  not  (lesird(l.  Ildeed,  the  opposite  is  the  case.  It  can
be  argueld  that  corporate  taxes  shlold(  be  (id(hicte(l  algainst  the  resource  tax  base.
If  so.  the  rent  tax  woil(l  impose  n1o further  (listortionis  over  and  al)ove  those  already
ilm)pose(l  by  thle  corporatc  tax.  Failing  to  allow  a  dedc  Iction  woiilol  imply  that  the
resource  tax  further  cc  l  oli)polllds  thlce (distorItion  of  thle  corporate  tax.  Ill  fact,  ani  efli-
(cilet  Syste  e  woulld  allow  a  fllll  tax  cred it  of  thll( corporate  tax  against  the  resource
tax.  This  wolull  1iiI(do th 1cc (listortil-  igffe(c(t  of tle(  formler.  Hfowever  it  woulld  also
1111(1d tl('  effect  th(e  (c )rp)() ate  tax  has  ont  taxinig,  ca)ital  income  thereby  defeatinig
its  p)11r)po)Sc'. FIirt hleriic ne.  it  clla  - un(d0  t1heo  ai1vantm,it  'S  of  obt  aining  a  foreign  tax
credit  ill  thlie  case  of  fireigtil  fims.
(¾  Ab~o.' ufLo,',  Oflf14  tt/?lj  oind  UPC' 7tUiflt1
I(osttt tax  tllstc  lls  (ourcc  tax(eS  inclh  ded . do  Ilot  offer  fuill loss  offset tiig.  At  best
Hey  offer  p)artial  loss offlsettilng lby  all(winog fiirllls  in  a  loss  position  to  carry  forward
Or backward  l  sses  fmi  a  liinited  1i  umber  of  years.  Firmiis  can  be iii  a  loss  position  for
a  iliumbcr of reaso ns.  They  iiiay  be yo( nf,.  growing  firiiis  wlo  are  involve(l  hieavily in
illvestlleilt  1)11  whose  rVCtIIlies  are  exl)ecte  d( to  accruc  *ciiy  ill  thle  fii tir(.  Tllhey  may
be  firins  wlic  o  t(  111p1  prarily  ill  a  ]o9  css 0)SitiO( l)e  sc  of  depr  ss5(l  otpulit  priees.
01r  the' Illay  bI  duclinilg  firilis.  Tle  albse  1cc  of  filll  loss  cff(sc tting  is  particularly
harmllfull lor  l  first  two  type)s  of  fii  iiis.  'Tlhese call  Ibc  firms  whichi  are  stretchied
fOrc  finallc  in  01'  WhlIm  I  I  arn  ll  liilcertaill  (ci  Vir'clirilits.  s  Imperfcct  loSS  offsetting  c(an
('XaWcralat(c I(tlh  problctI's.
1GCResource firmis  are tylpically relatively  11or0 likely to experience p)erio(ds  of loss.
Since  tley  are  hlighly  (ap)ital-inteIiSivc,  they  are  typically  ill  a  loss  position  whell
yotiung  and  growinig.  As well, their  fortuics  arc likely  to  bc  ili  1!1(>1'('  tilctaitin
since resource  prices are kinowin  to  fluctuiate niorc tHan t han for other  Pr(oducts.
f.  Treubtcii(7lt  of Forcigv  nc  o  ct
A fin.al  relevanlt  general  colisideratioxi  is thc  fart  that  the  resource  buiisiniess  is  typi-
cally  an  international  one.  That,  is,  resou rce fixiiis  ofte'l  opcratc  ill  iiloii  t hal  mlc
counltry.  This  cati  have  stvveral imiplicationis  for  their  tax  tre atinent.  For one tlinllg.
initernational  op)erations  open  up  opportunirties  for  avoidance  of  thi  soirt  discussed
earlier.  This  Iweaiis  that  if onc coiiintry's  tax  rates  are  oit  of line  wit  li those  ill othl-
ers, it  milay he  difficult  to  imioniitor  and  enforce  tatx collections.  Also.  international
tax  coniventions  will  have  at bearing  oni the  tax  treatment  of resource  firixis  Capital
importinig  countries  will  need  to  take  accoinIt  of  the  homie, country  tax  treatimenlt
of foreign  firmris.  For example,  if home  countries  credit  taxes  p)ai(l  abroad.  Which  is
often  thie  casel  for  bhusiness  taxes,  it  is  in  the  interest  of  thc  lhost country  to  take
advantage  of the  credlit by  mimicking  the  home  country's  tax  system..  If such  credlits
are  not  available,  or if  a  (leductioll  system  is uised.  atte(mpts  to  tax  capital  income
of foreign  firims will  be  frustrate(l.  Becaise  of  the  miobility of capital.  the  tax  will
enrd III) b)eing shifted  1)ack to  other  factors  ol  pro)(hIct ioll  in  thl  hIost  (olliltry.  OnI
the  othier  han(l,  if the  tax  is onl the  renlt componeint  of eqIlit  y  i  Iico(%II.  it  II('I  lnot  Ie
shifted.  Indeed,  it  will  nlot be  except  by  the  IIS(e  of avoidance  techii(jues.  ryp)ically
resource  tax  systems  will niot be elig;il;Ic for forcig,n tax  crediting  So  will  CoTSti tllte
ani  additional  t ax  l)birden  on  foreign  (corp)orationls.  Tlis  will provide  some  incentive
for  tax  avoidancc  Ileasures.
Resourcle  taxes.  uilike  income  taxcs  are  gneraLIIy  le  vied  ulsinlg,  ti[C  lo  tirCf  ITrill-
ciple  rather  than  oi  a  worldwide  orI residency  basis.  Each  c(  iit iy  trealts  as  its  0
property  rights  sonim share  of  the  t he  res(  'urce  renlts  acCrlillpg  wit  lill  their  l  oudl  I(  -
aries.  This  is p)rob)ably  a necessary  featurc  o  r(  'so()Irc t.ax  r ('iI!Jmes  rather  thialil  l)eilig
an  abstractt  principle  of  the  (clivisil  oi  of  intc(rlmat  iolial  property  IVi,it.s.  It  would  lie
very  difficult  to  imionitor rents  earned  abroad  by  (loinestic  firimis.
Given  this  backgroun(l  of general  issuies.  let  uis  1ioW  nIIrn  to  a  c onsideratioll  of
sonme of  the  means  by  which  resource  rentIS  can  I)(  taxed.  Inl prillciplc.  the  rcis  ('trce
tax  l)ase  coUl(d be  defined  as  economic  p)rofits  or  lc(  its  of  r  S(  il(r  firiIls  Itil  a It  tax
applied  to  tlhat.  However,  as  icileitioiled  airlier.  such  ri tlX  1),Is(' W()I  i(l  1Ic vir tlially
irnm)ossil)le  to  iplj)lem(cnt.  It  wouil(l  involve  imipuijltiI-  c()rsts  to  the  firIII  wilih  are  n(ot
(directly  observable  including  (  cprc(  iiati;on.  depiltinI  (of  no ni-Io'lle'wal(i  rSe)1s(m('i  .
the  cost  of  :uirmrenit  uises  if  rnewabc  rl)le  r  sourlc (s . risk.  and  t lie  r  'al  c0  ist  of  fiil  ui,1(C.
Thits.  frorim  a  practical  poinit of view  it  is  Ilot  f(easile)  to  tax  le'llts  s  t.sl'v'  a1'(rlc.
17Fortunately,  there  are  other  ways of devising  a  tax  base  which  are  equivalent  in
present  value  terms.  We begin  with  an  outline  of alternative  equivalent  measures
of economic rents.
2.  Some  Equivalent  Ways  of  Measuring  Rents
It  is  useful  to  begin  by  recalling  precisely  what  is  included  in  the  definition  of
economic rents  in principle  before turning  to  alternative  equivalent  measures.
a.  Economic  Rents
Current  rents  are  defined  to  be  the  value  of current  outpuit  sold  by  the  firm  in
the  current  period  less the  full opportunity  cost  incurred  by  the  firm  during  the
period  to  produce  those  outputs.  The  costs can be  sub-divided  into  two categories
- the  costs  of current  inputs  and  the  costs  of capital  inputs.  Current  inputs  are
those  which  are  used  in  the  period  in  which  they  are  purchased.  Capital  inputs
are  those  which  produce  services over several  periods.  Their  contribution  to  each
period  must  be appropriately  capitalized.  All costs  must  be measured  in  terms  of
a common  numeraire,  typically  either  currenlt dollars  or constant  dollars,  The  fact
that  prices  are  changing  over  time  gives rise  to  two  complications.  One  concerns
the price  of capital  goods and  the other  concerns  the  discouiit  factor  to use.  These
will be discussed  below.
Current  Inputs.  Current  inputs  are typically  taken  to include  such things  as wages
and  salaries,  rmaterials,  fuels,  rents,  and  so forth.  The  classification  of inputs  as
current  is not  withouit arribiguity.  Some inputs  which  may appear  as  current  may
actually  have  a  capital  component  to  them.  One  exainple  concerns  labour  costs.
In  mnany  cases,  labour  once hired  can be  viewed as a  quasi-fixed factor.  Typically,
there  is a period of training  involved early in the tenure  of the worker.  To the extent
that  the  firm bears  the  cost of that  training  (e.g., if the training  yields skills which
are  specific  to  the  firrm), part  of the  wage payment  reflects  not  a  payment  for  the
production  of current  input,  but  for  the production  of future  input.  In  this  case,
part  of the  wage represents  a capital  cost and should  be capitalized.  Also, the  wvage
pa+ftern rnay Ilot  follow the productivity  pattern  of the worker over the ernployrnent
tenure  of the  worker.  For example,  the  firm may  use the  wage  profile to  increase
attachment  to  the  firmn  essentially  by  postponing  wage  payments.  Alternatively,
the  firm  may  act  as  a  sort  of financial  intermediary  to  the  worker  by  providing
more funds  in  the form  og higher  wages earlier  in  the  work life..  Finally,  labor  of
the firm might  also be uied  to produce  and/or  install  tangible  capital  for the  firm,
such  as  buildings,  machinery  and  inventory.  That  part  of the  wage bill ought  to
be  treated  as a capital  input,  though  it  is difficult to distinguish  the  amount  of the
18wage  bill that  goes for these  purposes.  For all these  reasons,  wage  paymenits irnay
not  properly  reflect current  output.  A true  measure  of profits  would require  wages
to  be  appropriately  adjusted.  Of course,  that  would be very  difficuilt to  do, and  to
that  extent  rents  will be incorrectly  rneasure(l.
For closely-held businesses in which owners are also mnanagers, another  (lifficulty
arises.  The reward  that  the  owner-manager  receives for operatiIng the  blusiness  will
be  partly  a  return  to  capital  and  partly  a  return  to  labour.  In  practice,  the  two
will be difficult to  distinguish.  This  will be irmportant if capital  income anld lab)our
incomes are  treated  differently  for tax  purposes.
Another  example  concerns  the  acquisition  of intangible  capital  by  the  firnm
including  goodwill  and  knowledge.  Often  this  is  a  result  of  particular  types  (f
expenditures  such as advertising  and  marketing.  These  costs  should,  in  principle,
also  be  capitalized,  but  are typically  treated  as if they  were currenit costs.  Again,
to  capitalize  the costs of using intangible  capital  would be extrermely difficult, if not
impossible.  This  will be another  source  of inaccuracy  in  the measurerrment of rents.
These  sorts  of examples  can occur  in the  resource  industries  as well.  In non-
renewable  resources,  exploraticn  expenditures  help to create  information  about  the
location  and  size of deposits.  This  is  a form  of intangible  capital  which  ought,  in
principle,  to  be treated  as suclh.
Capital  Inputs.  Even  more  difficult  coilceptual  issues  arise  in  the  treatmeilt  of
capital  inputs.  They  yield productive  oultput  over more  than  the  period  in  which
they  arc acquired.  The  problem  is to attribllte  to a period  the full cost  of using  the
capital.  In principle  there  are three  sorts of costs  associated  with  the  use of capital
for a period:
i.  Depreciation.  We will use the  term  depreciation  in a genIeral sense  to inclul(dc
all forms  of UsiIng  tip capital  including  wear and  tear  of machinery  and  build-
ings,  depletion  of a  stock  of non-renewable  resource,  the  use of an  item  from
inventory,  and  the  use  of the  existing  stock  of renewable  resource.  Sonic  of
these are more readily  measured  than  others.  For non-reniewable resources  and
inventories,  the  current  usage  should  simply  be costed  at  the  full value of the
amount  taken.  These  may be  readily  measurable  using  rriarket  values.  In  the
case of  depreciable  capital,  the  reduction  in  the  value  of the  capital  dlue to
depreciation  through  use  should  be  treated  as depreciation.  Since full  mar-
kets  for depreciating  capital  typically  (1o  not  exist.  this is virtually  impossible
to  measure  precisely.  For renewable  resources.  as we have mentioned  earlier,
the  opportunity  cost  of taking  sonme  resourcc now is the  change in the  amount
that  may  be  taken  in  the  future.  This  requires  that  the  optimal  path  of fu-
19ture  extraction  be  known.  In  all cases,  depreciation  should  b)C  costed  at  its
replacemnernt value.
ii.  Fi nancin  Costs.  Holding  a  stock  of cap)ital of any  kind( for a  perio(i  of tirne
involves fiinanicinig  costs,  either  payments  such as interest  that  muist be made
to  creditors,  or  compensation  for  the  use of one's  own capitai.  The  latter  is
the  cost  of equity  capital  and  is  the  rate  of return  that  is just  re(lllire(l  to
cornpensaLe the  owner for  ulsinlg  his funi(is in this  firin instead  of placing  theml
elsewhere.  Thus,  it  is  an  opportunity  cost  which  partly  takes  the  form  of
a  forgone  return.  The  cost  of equity  finarncinig  for  a  give(I firil  will consist
of two components  the  market  rate  of return  that  could  have beei  earned
elsewhere plus the risk premliumxi  associated  with this firm.  The latter  is (lifficult
to  measure.  The  financing  cost  shoul(d be  based  on the  full replacernent  value
of capital  of all forms held by the firm.  This  includes the  net value of accounts
payable  (i.e., accounts  payable less accounts  receivable).  Furthermnore, the  cost
of finance  should  be the  real cost  rather  than  the norninal  cost.  For example,
the nominal  interest  rate  will include a component  which compensates  creditors
for  the  fall in  the  value  of their  asset  due  to  inflation.  As such,  it  represents
a  chaiige in  the  principal  rather  than  an  interest  cost.  The  nominal  interest
should be reduced  by the rate  of inflation,  unless, of course,  the asset  is indexed
for inflation.
iii.  Capital  LossL.C. Finally.  if  the  relative  price  of a  capital  good  falls  over  the
period,  that  shouild also be treated  as a cost  of holdirng the capital.  Of course,
this  terin  couild either  be positive  or negative.  If the price  of a non-renewable
resource  in the gr(ouln(d  rises,  this reduces  the cost of holding it,  and  vice versa.
In(leed,  in  the  theory  of resource  extraction,  expected  changes  in  price  are  a
hey  deterIninant  of the  decision as to how  mullch  to extract.
Capital  costs  should  include  each  of the  three  itemls as  apl)rop)riate for  all forms
of  capital  whether  del)reciable  capital,  land(. inventories,  non-renewable  resource
stocks  or renewable  resouirces. There shoiil(d be no other  deduictionis  for these items.
In particular,  costs of acquiring  the capital,  incluiding leases and  property  rights  to
resources  shouild not  be deducted.  To do so would involve double-colunting.
Present  Value and  Discounting.  The  above discussionl concerns rents  in the  current
period.  Firins  will typically  operate  for several perio(ds and  will take decisions from
a  long-term  perspective.  At  a  givcn  point  of  tirne,  what  will  be  re]evant  is  the
present  value  of future  rents  rather  than  just  current  perio(d rents.  This  shotuld
b)c what  a  profit-inaximizing  firmn  is interested  in  imaxirmizing. There  are  several
iSStles  involved  in  measuring the  present  value  of future  rents.  One  concerns  the
tinme horizoni its(,  lf.  The  typical  practice  is  to  take  the  time  horizon  as  being  the
20indefinite  future  (i.e., infinity)  if there is no reason  to expect  the firm to terminate
operations  before then.  Even though  the current  owners will no longer be owners at
some time  in the  futulre, they  still have an interest  in  the subsequlenit operations  of
the firin since that  determines  the value for which they  (or their  estate)  can sell the
firrn.  A finite-titile  horizon will be relevant  if, for sonme  reason,  the  firrn expects  to
cease opcrations.  In the resource industry,  a firmi may expect  the resources  it holds
to  run  ouit.  Or,  it  mray have  acquired  property  rights  for  a  fixed  length  of time  only.
Another  reason for ceasing operations  is the possibility  of bankrupcy.  In any case, in
the  event of ceasing operations,  there  must  be an accouniting of the disposal  (scrap)
value  of assets  on  harn(i at  the  tile.  There  may  also  be  certain  costs  associated
with  shutting  down,  such  as  responsibility  for  disposing  of hazar(lous  waste  in  the
case  of  mrines.
Another  issue  is  the  choice  of  a  discounit  factor.  Assuming  well-functioning
capital  markets,  this  should  be  the  rate  at  which  the  shareholders  of  the  firm  are
able  to  convert  present  into  future  consumption.  Presumably  this  is some  variant
of  the  market  interest  rate.  Note  that  there  is  no  need  to  incorporate  into  the
discount  factor  a  risk  component.  This  is  already  included  as  part  of  the  cost  of
earning  income  in  each  period.
A final  issue  in  discounting  is the  treatment  of inflation.  We have  already  noted
that  in  accounting  for  depreciation.  the  replacement  value  tor  capital  ought  to  be
used,  and  the  same  applies  for  all  forms  of capital  from  inventory  to  non-renewable
resources.  That  correction  is  intended  to  correct  for  changes  in  the  relative  value
of  capital.  There  is,  in  addition,  the  issue  of how  to  treat  changes  in  the  general
price  level,  or  inflation.  There  are  two  alternative  but  equivalent  procedures  that
can  be  used.  One  is  to  ineasure  all  revenues  and  costs  in  current  dollars  and  to
discouint  using  a  nominal  interest  rate.  The  other  is  to  deflate  all  future  prices  to
some  constant  dollar  value,  and  discount  themrl using  a real  discount  rate.  Note  that
this  is  quite  separate  frorn  the  use  of a  real  interest  rate  for  rneasuring  the  cost  of
finaince.  The  latter  should  be  done  iII  any  case.
We can  suirirnarize  succinctly  the  present  value  of future  rents  (econoinic  prof-
its)  for  a representative  special  case  in  the  following  expression  which  ignores  taxes:
7Z  =  (l  + R)->(PtYt - WtLt - Qt(6  -t- R - AQt/Qt)Kt)  (1)
t=O
where  1? is  the  discount  rate  of the  firmn, Pt  is  the  price  of  output  in  period  t,  Yt
is  the  quantity  of  output  sold,  Wt  is  the  pricc  of  the  cuirrent  input  Lt,  Qt  is  the
price  of the  capital  good,  6 is the  depreciation  rate,  and  Kt  is  the  stock  of  capital.
Note  that  all  prices  and  rates  of  return  are  in  nominal  terms.  It  is  assumed  for
illustrative  purposes  that  the  firm  produces  a single  output  using  one  current  input
21ali(l  1one  current  outp)llt.  It  is also  assurried  that  depreciation  is a fixed proportion
of the  existing  stock  (i.e.,  exponential  or  declining  balance),  ana  that  the  nominal
disconIit  factor  is  fixe(d.  Assume  further  that  the  inflatiorn  rate  is  constanlt  at  the
rate  7,r. Themi (1)  can  be  rewritten  in  the  following  equivalent  form:
1  =  Z(1  + r)- t (PtYt  --  wtLt  - qt(6 + r  ---  Atq/qt)Kt)  (2)
t -() 
where  r,  pt  Wt  and  (it are  real  equivalents  of their  associated  nomiinal  values  and
are definied as:  (1 +r)(1  +-r)  = (1I-+R),  (1 +Ipt)(l  +7r) t = (1 +Pt),  (1 +wt)(1  4-r)-
(1 +  Wt)  anld  (1 +  q(t)(1 + 7r)t  =- (1  t-  Qt).  This  illustrates  the  equivalence  of  Iusilng
nominal  prices  and  discountiing  by  it  Inioinial  (liscount  rate,  anid  tusinlg  real  prices
with  a  real  discount  rate.
b.  Cash Flow
The  above  description  of economic  rents  confirms  that  it  is very  difficult  to  measure
rents.  However,  there  are  alternatives  which  have  the  same  present  value  as  rents
but  which  are  much  easier  to  measure.  As we  have  mentiorned,  one  of  these  is  the
cash  flow  of  the  firm,  which  is  simply  the  net  value  of  all  real  transactions  of  the
firm  during  a  period.  More  specifically,  the  cash  flow of the  firm  would  include  the
cashi receipts  from  sales  of outputt  less  the  full  cost  of purchases  of all  inputs,  both
capital  and  cuirrent.  Revenues  and  currenit  costs  woulid all be accounted  for on  a cash
basis  rather  than  an  accrual  basis.  So  would  all  capital  costs.  The  cost  of capital
installatior  wou(ld b  de(lducted fully  as  the  investment  occurred.  There  is no  need
to  account  separately  for  depreciation,  cost  of finance  and  capital  gains.  The  cost  of
inventory  use woiil(l  )e deducted  when  the  inventory  was acquired  rather  than  when
it  is  used,  and  at  the  actual  price  of  acquisition.  There  is  thus  no  need  to  irripute
re,placemient  costs  or  to  worry  about  the  cost  of  finanicing  and  capital  gains.  As
well.  the  cost  of acquiring  resource  properties  incliiding  exploration,  development,
prol)erty  rights,  etc.  woul(d all  be deducted  ui) front  as would  the  cost  of intangibles.
Thus,  there  woul(d be generally  no  need  to worry  about  either  imputing  costs  which
did  not  go  throulglh the  market  nor  to  ind(ex capital  costs.  Furthermore,  there  is no
need  to  incluide  the  cost  of risk-taking  as  a  separate  cost.
That  is  not  to  say that  there  would  be no problems  at  all in  measuring  cash
flows.  There  are  still  a  couple  of difficulties.  One  concerns  owner-managed  firms.
These  firms  coul(d arbitrarily  reduce  the  values  of their  cash  flows  by  paying  profits
out  as  salaries.  As  well,  international  conmpanies  could  change  their  cash  flows  in
various  juris(lictions  by  me ans  of transfer  pricing.  However,  these  difficulties  already
exist  in  the  rent  tax.
The  present  value  of  cash  woul(d he  obtained  by  simply  discounting  rents  at
22the  sharcelold(rs'  (liscollult ratc.  (Of course,  there  may  be  some  ambiguity  here
as  well sincc differnIIt shareholders  may  have different  discount  rates,  say, due  to
different  tax  rates.  Again,  a  similar  problem  also  arises  with  discountinlg rents.)
The  important  feature  of the  present  value of cash  flow for our purposes  is that  it
should  be  exactly  the  same  as the  present  value of rents.  This  can be  illustrated
using  the  same example  as above.
The present  value of cash  flow is defined as:
00
C =  (1  + r)-  (ptYt  - wtLt  - qtIt)  (3)
t=o
where  It  is investment  expenditures.  To  see the equivalence  between  (3)  and  (2),
note  first that  the terms involving revenues and  current  costs are identical  so we can
concentrate  on the  capital  costs.  To make  things  as  simple as possible  to  explain,
suppose  thiat the rate  of increase  in capital  goods  prices is constant  at p =  Aqt/qt.
Then,  the price of capital  goods at  time  9 is related  to  that  at time  t  < s as follows.
q8  =  (1 +  p)  qt.  (4)
Consider  the  total  amount  of investment  undertaken  at time  t,  It.  Given the depre-
ciation  rate  6, it gives rise to  a stream  of capital  at each time  s in the  future  equal
to  (1 + 6)-(8)I 1t.  Using (4), the  value of this  stream  of capital  is given by
qK=  (  (  +  P)  qt It
where  K'  is the arnount  of capital  at time  s that  resulted  from investment  at  time
t.  The  total  capital  at  time  s is given by:
q8  E01  +  6))  qtI  (5)
Substitution  of  (5) into  (2)  and  simplification  yields  (3).  Intuitively,  the  present
value of the  future  stream  of accrued  costs resulting  from  $1 of investment  is just
$i.
Thus,  the  present  value of cash flow is equivalent  to  the present  value of eco-
nomic profits.  Naturally,  the time  profile of the two will differ.  It should  be obvious
that  net  cash  flow is typically  lower than  rents  in early  periods  and higher  later  on.
This  may  cause difficulties for governments  in  attempting  to tax  cash flows, and  it
would  be  useful to  seek ways of avoiding the  problem.  Fortunately,  there  exists  an
alternative  to  cash flows which has the same present  value, which is almost  as easy
to  implement  and  whose net  value can  take on any arbitrary  time  profile.  We turn
to  that  next.
23c.  Cash-Flo'w Equivalent
A  very  general  tax  base  can  be  defined  which  has  the  sarne  p)resent  value  as  rents
an(l  cash  flows,  and( for  which  rents  and( cash  flows  are  special  cases.  First  of  all,
define an  accounting  stock of capital At  implicitly  in  the  followinig  way:
,AAt  - QtIt  -- .etAt  (6)
where  cyt is the  proportion  of the  existing  accounting  stock  of capital  that  is written
off in  period  t.  We  will refer  to  att  as  the  taz  depreciation  rate  at  timne t.  Note  that
it  can  vary  over  tine.  The  i(lea  is that  all  new  investment  increases  the  accounting
stock  of capital,  while  aity tax  depreciation  re(luces  it.  Tlhis,  the accounting  stock
of  capital  is  siniply  the  aggregate  of  l)ast  undepreciated  investment  evaluated  at
historic  cost  (i.e.,  there  is  no  inflation  indexing  imposed).  The  cash-flow  equivalent
income  base  is defined  as:
PtY,  - WtLt  - (R  + eit)Ae.
The  present  value  of the  cash-flow  equivalent  income  base  is  therefore:
= (1  +  ?)-t (Ptyt  - WtL.  - (R  + oit)At),  (7)
t=o
Several  observations  can  be  made  about  the  cash-flow  equivalent  tax  base.
First,  by  a  technique  analogotus  to  that  used  for  cash  flows,  it  can  be  shown  that
the  value  of £ is equivalent  both  to 7Z  and  to C.  The  form  of the  cash  flow-equivalent
base  is  sinmilar to  that  of  the  rent  base  except  that  capital  costs  are  based  oIn the
accounritirng cal)ital  stock.  Nomninal  deductions  are  given  for  the  cost  of finainee  of
RAt,  anld  depreciation  is  also  based  onI At.  The  rate  of  depreciation  at  is  quite
arbitrary.  It  can  vary  by  size arid  over  time  as  well.  The  higher  is the  depreciation
rate,  the  lower  will  be  the  accounting  stock  of  cap)ital  and( the  lower  will  be  the
cost  of finance  write-off.  The  cash-flow  equivalent  base  woul(l  replicate  rents  if the
depreciation  rate  were  set  equal  to  the  true  econornic  depreciation  r  te  that  is,  if
(tt  =  o --  AQt/Qt.  That  can  l)e seen  directly.  Of  course,  it  is  ciiffleilt  to  do  so
exactly  since  truie (lep)reciation  cannlot  be  observedl.  At  the  sairie  time,  the  cash-flow
equivalenit  1)ase ap)proaches  cash  flow as  the  depreciat:ion  rate  approaches  infinity.
In  principle,  the  depreciation  rate  can  be  arbitrarily  chosen.  It  can  even  be
chosen  by  the  firm.  However,  it  mlight  be  natuiral  to  constrain  the  choice  of  ot  by
the  firm.  For  example.  the  firm  inight  be  tempted  to  choose  att as  high  as  possible
to  postpone  tax  liabilities.  The  government  mriight  then  constrain  the  firnm never  to
have  a  negative  cash  flow.  If  this  constraint  were  imposed.  the  system  would  be
exactly  like  a  cash  flow System  with  loss carry-forward  at  the  interest  rate  P.
24As  mentioned,  a  useful  property  of  the  cash-flow  equivalent  tax  base  is  its
ease  of implementation  relative  to  true  rents.  There  is  rio need to  ol)serve  true
depreciation.  Nor is there  aniy need  to  inledX  for inflation.  The  depreciation  rate
used is completely  arbitrary.  It can be at different  rates for different  tyl)es of capital.
It is even possible  to treat  current  inputs  as capital  ones for this  purpose.  Siniiilarly,
all expenditures  on resources  can be included  as  forrmis  of accounting  cap)ital ani(
have  ai book  value  associated  witlh tlhemIt.  It  is  always  possible  to  lilpl)  together
various  types  of expend(Iitures into a single composite  stock of capital  for accounting
purposes  as long  as  they  have  the  sainel tax depreciation  rate.
In short,  the  theoretical  literature  tells  uts that  it  is relatively  easy  to  dlevise
anl incoilme measure  which  is equivalent  in p)resent  value  terms  to  rents.  With  this
background,  let  us consider the  sorts of mnechianisms  that  have been useCd  for taxing
resources  and  compare  thern against  the  rent  benchmnark.
3.  Rent-Maximizing  Decision  Rules
Eiquations (2), (3) and (7)  all yield  the  sarnne  value.  Any of therm could  )(e viewed
as being  lie objective  fniictiori for a profit-inaxinlizing  firml inl the absence  of taxes.
Maximizing  themn  will give rise to a stream  of deirmands  for current  and capital  inptuts
'by the  firm.  It  is  worth  at  this  point  indicating  the  conditions  that  characterize
the  optimnal choice of current  and1  cap)ital inpuits in  the  al)sence of taxes  so we can
indicate  later  how taxes impinige on these decisions by the firmri.  To do so, we suppose
that  the  quiarntity  of outl)ut  is detern-ined  l)y a p)roduction fu.nction Yt  F(Lt,  Kt ),
and  that  the  firnm  is  a  p)rice-taker in  all  markets.  Under  these  assuminptions, the
rnarginial  conditions  dletermiining  the  choice  of current  inputs  Lt  and  capital  inipuits
Kt in  each  (  )erio(l  are  giveII by:
PtFL,  =_  Wt  (8)
Pt  Q  t  - - )  (9)
These  equtationis state  that  inlputs  shoill(  l)e used  up) to  the  point  at  which
marginal  benefits  equal  rriargirial costs.  The  rrargirnal  beniefit is thc  value  of thc
marginal  product  given  by the  left-hand  sidc  of the  two equations.  The  margiinal
cost  of  usirig the  current  input  is simply  its  price  per  uinit,  Wt.  For the  capital
input,  the  marginal  cost  is the  right-han(d  side of equation  (9),  and( is  referred  to
as  the  user co,st of  cap jtal.  It  consists  of the  three  costs  of hol(dinig  capital:  real
depreciation,  the  cost  of finance  and(i  the  capital  loss.  Note  that  equtationis (8)  and(
(9) cari  be  rewritten  inl terinis  of real  prices  as follows:
ptFL, =-  ivt  (8')
25PtFK,  = qt ( + r - dq).  (9')
The  above  equation  for capital  costs is  a general  one  that  can  be  applied  to
all sorts  of capital,  although  it is most  directly  applicable  to  depreciable  capital.  It
is useful  to  recast  it  to  apply  to  other  types  of capital  specifically  used  il. the  re-
source industries.  Three cases are considered  - non-renewable  resources,  renewvable
resources  and  inventories.
a.  Non-Renewable  Resources
Consider  the  case in  which  a firm has  a stock  of non-renewable  resource  and  has
to  choose  the  rate  of extraction.  Let  the  real  price of a unit  of the  resource  be  pt
and  the  real marginal  cost of extracting  a unit of the resource  be ct.  The  stream  of
prices is given to the firm, but  the marginal  cost rises with  the quantity  extracted  in
each period.  Then  the optimality  condition  which  determines  the rate  of extraction
is given by the  so-called  Hotelling  Rule which states:
A(p-C)  )
p - c'
The right-hand  side gives the opportunity  cost of holding the resource in the ground.
The  left-hand  side gives the net rate  of return  from holding it.  If the left-hand  side
is less than  the right-hand  side,  the firm will want  to increase  its rate  of extraction,
causing  its  marginal  cost  to  rise  until  the  two sides  come into  equality,  and  vice
versa.  Of course,  this  is a  very stvlized  way of looking at  the extraction  decision,
but  it does  capture  the fundamental  forces at work.
b.  Renewable  Resources
As an  illustration  of a renewable  resource,  consider  a  stand  of trees  which  is har-
vested  using clear-cut  techniques.  Slightly different  expressions  will be obtained  for
other  types  of renewable  resources,  such  as a  fishing  ground.  However,  the  basic
principles  involved  will be similar.  Let  F(T)  be  the output  of a forest  whose trees
are  all of age T,  and  R(F(T))  is the  net  revenue  from  the  cutting  and  sale of the
trees.  At  the  beginning  of the  planning  period,  suppose  that  a  crop  of  trees  is
planted  at  a  cost  of C.  Suppose  the  revenue  function  and  the  planting  costs  are
unchanging  over time  for simplicity.  The only  decision that  the  forester  must  take
is the  age T  at  which  to  clearcut  the  forest  and  replant.  This  is referred  to  as the
rotation  period.  The future  operation  of the  forest  consists  of an indefinite  number
of cycles of planting  and  clearcutting  each of length  T.  Thus,  he incurs  an  initial
cost  of C,  and  then  receives a sequence of net  revenues of R(F(T))  - c and  T,  2T,
3T,  and  so on.  Thus,  the  present  value of the cash  flows from the  operation  is:
26V _(R(F(T))  - C)(1 +  r)-T
l  -(+r)-T
Choosing  T  to  rnaximize  this  yields  the  following  optinmality  condition:
AR(F(T))  _  Iln(l +  r)
R(F(T))  -- c  1 - (1 4- r)-l'Y
This  equation  has  basically  the  same  fortzi  as  that  for  the  non-renewable  re-
source.  The  left-hand  side  is the  mnarginal value  froni  increasing  the  rotation  period
while  the  right-hand  side  is the  financial  cost  associated  frorn  the  pl)stponement  in
harvesting.  The  complicating  feature  is  the  fact  that  increasinig  the  rotation  period
affects  each  and  every  rotation  into  the  indefinite  fututre.
c.  Inventories
Suppose  a  firm  has  to  decide  how  much  of some  good  tc  hold  as  inventory.  The
good  can  be  a  final  product  or  an  intermediate  one.  Suppose  the  price  of  thc
good  at  time  t is  Pt.  There  rnay  also  be  a  storage  cost  of  ct  per  unit  of inventory
held.  Then,  the  user  cost  of  holding  a  tunit  of  inventory  consists  of  the  cost  of
financinig  the  inventory,  any  capital  loss  frorn  hol(liing it,  and  the  storage  cost.  The
holding  of inventories  presumably  gives  rise  to some  benefit  to  the  firm.  The  benefit
could  involve  cost  reductions  from  production  smoothinlg,  or  reductions  is risk.  Let
tus  simply  denote  the  mnarginal  benefits  frorn  holding  inverntories  as  MBt  withouit
specifying  their  source.  Then  the  optimal  stock  of inventory  holdings  will  be  that
at which:
MBt  = Pt (R  +  t  - pt)
Note  that  in  this  expression  the  user  cost  of inventories  is evaluated  at  replacement
cost  rather  than  the  cost  at  which  any  inventory  hol(lings  were  originally  acquired.
4.  Mechanisms  for  Taxation  of  Resource  Rents
The  theoretical  concept  of remit, which  is the  primiary  basis  of Imiost  resource  taxes.  is
relatively  clear.  But  the design  and implementation  of mechanisms  for its  taxation
tends  to  be less than  straightforward.  In this  section we deal with  general  types  of
such mechanisms  and with  some of the theoretical  and  practical  difficulties involved
in their  implementation.
27Mec(hlianiismiis  for rent colleCtioni  differ in niariy rcsl)ects.  One of the furidamenta'
listinictioi's is  l)btWeci  ('Z  ante  and( ex  po.t  rent  taxatiori.  Ex antc  collection  is  based
oni  the  sale  of  the  rights  to  the  expected  rents  fromil  a  resource  or  a.  site,  irn  the  fornii
of  some  sort  of  lease  or  concession  arrangement.  ET po.st collection  is  soIe  forll
of  taxation  tilat  is  based  on  the  actual  rents  that  are  derive(d  as  the  resource  is
exp)loited.  One  interesting  question  concerns  the  ap)prol)riate  milix between  ci  ante
and( it  ex  p)ost taxation  of resource  rents.  In  the  followinig  subscCtion  we  deal  with
the  princil)al  fortml  of  ex ante  rent  taxationi  the  sale  of leases  for  the  exploitation
of  a  resource.  Th1e  remaining  sections  (leal  witli  various  nmeanis  of  taxing  CY,  po.4t
resource  rents.
a.  Auct0oni,s
One  way  to  capture  the  rent  fromii a  resource  is  to  auction  the  rights  to  its  exp)loita-
tion.  In  competitive  b)idding  for  the  right  to  extract  an(l  sell  a  givenl resource,  a
government  shoIuil( exl)ect  to  be  able  to  collect  the  fuill amouniit of the  (x  ante  rent
from  that  resource.  This  wouil(d include  the  present  value  of  all  revenues  less  all
costs,  iIIcli(linlg  risk  and(i a norrrlal  return  to  all  investments,  fromri  its  extraction;  in
other  wor(ds, what  we have  called  1,  C and(l  £  al)ove  sllital)ly  corrected  for  expected
tax  p)ayments.  This  assumries, of course,  that  the  government  is  willing  to  lease  the
resotirce-P)ro(ducing  p)roI)erty  for  p,erp)etuity,  or  at  least  for  as  long  as  the  resource
has  any  econonImIc  value.
There  is a consi(lderal)le literature  on1  the  properties  of different  types  of auctions
seald(l-l)i(l  first-price,  sealed-  bi(l  secoi(l-price,  Dutch,  EnglishI,  etc.  While  there
arc  illaily  imlpo)Ortanlt lessOIs  froin  this  literature.  sonmie of  the  mio t  b)asic  mnessages
ar(  quite  simpil)le.  The  first  stresses  thci  iniportanice  of  coniUpetition  ini  the  I)i(Idiig;
p)rocess.  Witholut  competition,  there  can  1)be  1o  assurancl  that  the  government  will
sIi ceceel  in  (cap;turing  a  significanit  share  of  the  rents.  Conmipetition  iimiglit be  dhifficuilt
to  achieve  in  mlianly  ase's  l)ecauisc  of  asymmuiet ries  ini i nformniatioii  al)out  the  size.
quality,  or  other  characteristics  of  the  resouirce  in  question.  This  makes  it  even
more  impl)ortaant  that  the  government  riot  restrict  p)arti ci pationi  iii  other  ways.
The  sec ond  is  that  nuder  a  set  of  reasonable  assuirimptions.  the  above-mientioned
four  types  Of auctions  all  yiel(d  the  samne price  on  average.  The  assumptions  i ncludle
risk-neutral  and( syinuetric  bidders.  the  valuc  of  the  itei  being  bid  for  dependinrg
lipon  the  charactteristics  of the  bidders.  aii(i  paymnctit  being  a  fumnictionl  of  Ibidls  alone.
As  the  miuinbl)er of  l)id(ders increases,  the  average  reve(nic  of  thle  seller  increases.  As
the  1111111ler  of  bidders  b)ecomnes  in definitely  large  (i.  ..  the  compel  tive  case).  the
price  takes  on  it,s highest  v-ue,.  As nientioried  . ini the  case  of resources  flhis woildi  bel
the  I)resent, vralue  of rents.  ()f course,  if the  assuinnJ,tionis (to nlot appJ)ly,  tli(e different
types  of  aiuctions  will  m!et be equivalenit.  It  wouildl tak(e IIs  too  far  afield  to  c*onsid(Ier
the  opttiminal types  of  iaic(tions  for  different  ('irc  uiirstaticcs.
28For our  purposes,  the  important  conIsideration is that  given sufficient  cormlpe-
tition  in  the  bidding  process,  the  government  shoul(d be  able  to  capture  virtually
all of the  ex ante or expected  rents  from  the  exI)loitation  of any  resource  deposit.
A perceived  advantage  to  many  governmrents from  this  way of collecting  the  rents
is  that  the  payrnerit would  be  made tup  front,  at  the  beginning of the  extraction
process.  Only if the  )rivate  sector  and  the government  had(l  different  dliscount rates
would this  be of any  real significance.  If the government  had  a higher discount  ratc
than  the resource  extracting  firtm (whichi iright  be the case with large transnatiorial
firirrs working in  developing  countries),  then  the pre-paymnent feature  of ani auction
systerm rnight  be of some bellefit  to the  host  government.  If the opposite  were  the
case, thern aniy disadvantage  to  the government  of the  pre-payiment feature  (due  to
a lower  bid  price  by potential  developers)  could be  eliminated  by an  arrangemnenit
for postponement  of payments.
One  particular  form  of postponed  payment  systern  is an  annual  land  rent  for
the use of the  site on which the resource is located.  Any once-anid-for- all payment
for the  right  to exploit  a resource has an  annual  land  rental  fee to which it  is equal
in  present  value.  Apart  from  the  time  pattern  of payrnents,  there  are  some other
differences  between  land  rental  fees and  pre-payment  arrangements.  First,  the  risk
to  the  government  is greater  under  the  former arrangement.  In  the  event  that  the
resource  turns  out  to be  inuch less valuable  than  had  been anticipated  at  the  time
of  the  rental  agreement.  the  lessee  woul(l find  it  relatively  easy  to  renege  on  the
agreernent  by simply  ceasing  to pay  the rent.  There  is little  the  government  coul(d
do  to prevent  this.  Secon(d. under an annuiial rental  arrangernent,  the lessee would
have  an  incentive  to  exploit  the  resource  rriore quickly tharl  under  a  pre-payinent
system.l given the positive  marginial cost of exploiting  the deposit  for one additional
year.  This  inight  also  lead  to  under-exploitation  of the  resource  since  imarginlally
ecornonlical deposits  might  not  be  financially  attractive  to  extract  if  this  requires
extra  time  and( henice additionial  rental  payments  at  thc end  of a lease.
Ex ante rents,  of course,  are not  the same as ex post rents.  An auction  system.
as opposed  to  mrost other  systems  discussed  below, captures  the former.  Therefore,
auction  systemns  differ from  mnost  other  formns  of resource taxation  in that  they shift
the bulrden of risk from resource exploitation  onto the developers.  To the extent  that
social risk is less than  the  private  risk of the developers, this  lends sorne inefficiency
to auction  systerns  as a mneans  of collecting  resource rents  for the  pIublic sector.
A lease  auction  coul(d be  transformed  into  a, partial  or  full  el  post  paymnent
system  by  making  the  bids  somelhow contingent  on  the  value  or  quantity  of the
resource  actually  extracted.  For  instance,  lease  payimernts could  be  of  the  fortm
R  = a + bY where  Y is the value or volumne  of resources  retrieved  and  sold from  the
dleposit.  The  standard  pure  cx ante auction  system  is one in  which  b is set  equal
to  zero and  competitors  bid  on a.  Ani alternative.  however.  would be  for a  to  he
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royalty  systeiii in  which the royalty  rate  is set  by a competitive  bidding process.  A
miXe(l system  woulld  lbc  one  in  which  the  governmiernt  entertained  bids  on  both  a
and  b, or in which it set  a fixed positive  value of one of these paranieters and  asked
for bids on the  other.
Autction systerms also expose private  resource developers  to another  potentially
ilmportanrt forrn of political  risk arising frorn time inconsistent  behavior on the part  of
the governmnent. Having  condlucted an auction  and  coliected substantial  if not  coni-
plete  pre-l)aymnent of the negotiatedl lease price,  the  government  miglht be temrpted
at sonic later  date  to alter  the ternms  of the original  lease.  Such changes might range
from breaking  of the lease altogether  (i.e.  confiscating  the previously negotiated  ex-
ploitation  rights)  to the imposition  of windfall income  taxes when  ex post rents  tuirn
out  to  be grcater  than  ex ante rents.  In a  world of fluctuating  resource  prices  the
imposition  of such windfall  taxes  based  on short-term  rents  would  turn  out to  be
a  one-sided  bet  in  favour  of the  government.  Anticipation  of this  sort  of political
risk  would reduce  the  ability of the government  to collect  ex ante rents.  Of course,
an  anticipated  willingness of the government  to entertain  short-term  rent-based  ar-
gumiiernts  made  by lease-holders  in  times  of low resource  prices would  work in  the
opposite  direction.
In order  for the governmient to  nmaxirnize  the  proportion  of the  rents  it is able
to collect  from  an auctionl system,  it is important  that  all the terms  of the lease be
spec;fied  as clearly and( irrevocably  as possible  at the beginning.  This  applies  espe-
cially  to  the  conditions  under  which the  lease might  be altered  or terminated,  the
nature  of tax  ami(l  other  obligations  expected  of the  developer  throughout  the termr
of the  lease,  and( the  xicanis  throuigh which  any future  disputes  over these  rrmatters
mnight be  settled.  Regardless  of the  tightness  of all such arrangements,  reputation
cffects,  based  oII actual  behaviour  of the  host and  possibly  of other  governments
will be iimlportanlt  in  determining  their  effectiverness. It  is probably  because  of this
rmoral hazar(l  prol)lenmn  together  with  the  general  unwillingness  of governments  to
enter  into  long-terrm lease arrangemiienits  with private  resource  developers,  that  auc-
tions  and  other  forimis  of cx ante rent  collection  agreements  are seldom observed  as
methods  of taxing  economic rents  in developing  countries.
Resource  renits can  also be  lost  throulglh inappropriate  provision  in  long-term
leases  for  external  effects of the  exploitation  activity,  such  as environrnental  pol-
lution.  These  external  effects  might  be  an  ongoing  byproduct  of the  developer's
extraction  activities  and/or  they  might  be  long-term  costs  that  are  imposed  and
felt  primarily  after  the  conclusion  of the  project.  The  latter  might  be  especially
imnp)ortant in  conjunction  with  leases whose lives do not  match  the  economic  lives
of  the  rcsource  deposits.  particularly  in  the  case  of renewable  resources.  Mine
sites  niight  le  left  in  a  hazardous  state  after  the  expiry  of a  mining  operation.
30Forest  reserves  might  be  "mined"  with  inadequate  investment  in to  replenishment
and/or  replanting.  A short-run  revenue-maximizing  view  would  be  to  collect  all
the  "rents"  that  are possible  without  taking  these  costs into  account.  Such an  ap-
proach  might  be favoured  by boih  short-run  revenue-maximizing  governments  and
profit-maxirnizing  resource operators.  Perrnitting  mineral  operators  to mine  a  site
without  any  restrictions  on its  condition  at  the  conclusion  of the  operation  would
permit  the  government  to  maximize  the  bid  it would receive for the  rental  of that
site.  But  after  account  had  been taken  of the  costs of site clean up  after  the opera-
tor's  departure,  the net rents  received by the government  would almost  certainly  be
less than  those  that  would have been collected  if the bids  had  been rnade  with  the
tunderstanding  (and  the  incentive)  that  the  operator  would  be  responsible  for the
appropriate  environmental  management  of the  site.  Similarly,  a  lease for  a forest
concession  might  bring  in  much  more  money  to  the  government  if there  were  no
incentives  or requirements  for the concessionaire  to  invest in the  long-run  manage-
ment  of the  reserve.  But,  once again,  this  would  not  be  equivalent  to  maxirmizing
the  rent  from  the  resource.  Governme.it  revenues  would have  been maximized  at
the  sacrifice of long term  rents  and efficient resource  utilization.
b.  Cash Flow and Equivalent  Cash Flow Taxation
In our  review of the  concept  of resource  rent  and  its  measurement  we showed how
the present  value of t1ie net  cash flows of a resource firm is equivalent  to  the present
value of the  rents  from its  activities.  From  this it follows that  a tax  equal  to x%  of
a resource  developer's  cash flow would be equivalent  to  an x% rent  tax  and,  in  the
absence  of capital  market  imperfections,  would not  distort  the  efficient allocation
of resources  in  the  market.  Furthermore,  if the  tax  rate  were  100%, it  would  be
equivalent  to  the outcome  of a competitive  bidding  process  for resource  extraction
rights  except  for the fact  that  the cash flow tax would be an efficient collector  of ex
post rents,  while an auction  system  would do the same for ex ante rents.  A cash flow
tax  shifts  all  the  risks over actual  rent  manifestations  to  the  government,  whereas
a lease auction  places  these risks on the resource  developer.
The equivalence  between  a 100% cash flow tax  and  a competi6ve  lease auction
depends  as well on several critical  details of implementation.  1he  most important  of
these is the  treatment  of tax  1 Dsses. Most resource  ventures  have the characteristic
that  cash flows are negative  in early years and positive later.  In order  for a cash flow
tax  to  be  equivalent  to  a pure  rent  tax,  negative  cash  flows must  be a)  subject  to
immediate  refundable  tax  credits,  or b) permitted  to be  written  off against  current
taxable  income from  other  sources, or c) allowed to be carried  forward  with interest
at  prevailing  nominal  market  rates.  Without  such  provisions,  the  base  of a  cash
flow tax  would  exceed,  in present  value  terms,  that  of a  pure  rent  tax  for  a  loss
firm.  Such  a  tax  (i.e.  without  these  provisions  for  tax  losses)  would  no  longer
be non-distortionary:  it would discriminate  against  investments  with relatively  long
31gestation  periods  and  those  undertakecr  in periods  of relativelyI  high niomiiial  interest
rates.  It  woul(l  also  discriminate  against  youing,  growinig  firrns  at  the  explense of
older  estal)lished  onIes.  Anld, it wouil(l discriminate  against  risky  investments  and  in
favoutr  of  safe  ones.  Solving  this  problem  withl  alternative  1)),  i.e.  write-offs  of  tax
losses  agaiiist  other  cutrrenit  ililCOiie  sources.  Wol(l  bias  the  tax  system  inl favor  of
large  establishe(l  firmns aln(l  against  new  ventulres  witlhoiit  otlicr  ill(comlte  souriices.
Caslh  flow  taxes  are  relatively  uncommon.  Instead,  ianlay  governiments  impose
taxes  on  bases  which  are,  in  principle,  intended  to  be  equivalent  ( againi  in  present
value  termlls)  to  that  of  at cash  flow  tlx.  As  demiionstrate(l  iii  the  l)reviois  section,  a
tax  on  current  net  revenues  less  capital  cost  allowances  equal  to  the  suii1  of  economic
depreciation,  interest  costs  on  current  capital  stock  and  cal)ital  losses  (dtirinig  the
current  period  wouild  be  equivaleint  to  the  same  tax  levied  on  current  cash  flows.
The  dlifference  l)etween this  and  a  cash  flow tax  l)ase  is in  the  treatment  of capital
costs.  Instead  of  b)eing  written  off  at  the  time  of  their  expenditure,  capital  costs  are
amortized  am(i  deducted  fromi  revenues  according  to  their  current  user  cost.  This
method  tends  to  smooth  out  the(  time  patlh of  taxab)le  income  for  the  firmn  and,
in  particular,  to  miiake  it  rmiore likely  tlaw  there  will  be  current  revenues  against
which  to  write  off  tax-deductible  costs  that  occur  ini any  time  period.  However,  to
the  extent  that  discrel)ancies  still  (1o arise  between  current  revenues  and(  allowable
costs,  ap)prop)riate  methlo(ds  mulst  still  be  fouirnd  for  carrying  forwar(d  or  backwar(l
costs  which  are  in  excess  of taxal)le  revenues  in  anry  time  perio(d.
The  principal  problem  that  arises  with  cash  flow  equivalent  taxes  is  in  devis-
inig rules  for  defining  the  user  cost  of c;apital.  This  is especially  so  in  the  case  of
resource  taxation.  Trhere  are  not  only  the  standard  difficulties  of  defilliilg  appro-
priate  economic  depreciation  rates  an(l  rules  for  d(lelucti bility  of interest  expenses.
but  also  those  of  deterrining  the  appropriate  treatment  of  exploration  expenses.
"depletion"  allowances  and  expenses  i ncuirred  iII the,  maintenance  and(l management
of renewal)le  re.sou)rces.  The  prinlcipal  danger  in the  case  of non-rernewable  resources
is  that  of  dissip)ating  the  tax  base  by  allowing  excessive  deductions  for  exp)loration
and(  depletion  (as  is  often  the  case  witli  the  use  of  generouis  depreciationl  allowances
and/or  investment  tax  credits  with  thei  normIlal  corporate  tax).  For  example,  firmiis
are  often  allowe(d  a  separate  ded(uctiorn  for  depletion  over  an(d above  l)eing  able  to
write  off  rmany  of  the  costs  of  acquiring  a  resource  property  uii)  front.  This  obvi-
ouis]y  involves  doluble-counting.  In  the  case  of  renewable  resources,  suCh  as  forests.
the  more  prevalent  problem  is  that  of  overestimating  rents  by  not  allowing  p)ropefr
(leductions  for  rep)leniishiment  costs.  Deviations  such  as  these  fromn  a  pure  rent  tax
will  not  only  affect  the  tax  base  b)ut  also  (listort  investment  decisions  in  resource
exploration,  management  and( extraction.  We have  outlined  a general  mnetho(d above
for  (desigIling  a  tax  system  which  will have  the  property  that  it is equivalent  to  rent
taxation.  To  date.  no  countries  have  taken  advantage  of it.
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industries  is a  "rate  of retuirn"  tax or  a tax on  "added  value."  The  purpose  of this
sort  of tax  is  to  avoid  imiany of  the  ambiguities  and  arb)itrariness  of  atterripting
to  measuire  the  user  cost  of capital  by a  nore  certain  and( uniforrm measure.  The
measure  employed  for  this  purpose  is simply  the  replacement  cost  of the  current
cap)ital  stock  of  the  firrmi  times  the  current  market  rate  of interest.  While  this
avoi(ds soirie of  the  arbitrary  (listiinctionis that  iriiglht  occur  because  of differences
in  debt-e(quity  ratios  anl (ldifferen(ces  in  historical  values  of  investments  comnbi  ned
with  the  effects  of a(d hoc  depreciation  rules,  it  still  faces  important  problems  in the
measurement  of the  rep)lacement value of the  current  cap)ital stock.  The  l)rol)lemts
of determining  economicl del)reciation  and  of valuing the firin's  investrmients  remain,
albeit  in a slightly  different  forrmi.
c.  Royalties
Another  very  commonly  used  formn  of tax  for (liverting  rents  to  the  p)ublic sector
is a  royalty  or  severance  tax  levied  on  resource  extractions.  A system  of royalty
p)ayments could be eq(uivalent to a pure  ex post rent  tax if thc royalty  were designed
in  such  a  way  that  it  were equal  or otherwise  proportional  to  the  ecorionic  rents
associated  with  the  amouniits extracte(l.  This  would re(luire that  it  be b)ased oII the
value of the  extractions  less all the econormnic  costs associated  with  them.  Very few
royalty  systems  meet  this  re(luiremnent. A per  UInit  royalty  systeirm  takes  account  of
neither  the  value of the resources  sol(d nor  the cost  of their  extraction.  A per  unit
royalty  where the size of the paymnent depends  oni the gra(le or quiality of the resource
extracted  as well as its quality  goes part of the way towar(ds the solutiorn of the  first
of these  problems,  but  does not  dleal with  the second.  AnI ad valoreim systerml  based
on the  gross inarket  value of resource  p)roduction dleals more satisfactorily  with  the
first  problern,  buit still does riot help with  the secon(l. Ad valoremC  systemis base(I oII
net  revenues  generally  consider,  at  best,  only  current  costs  of resource  extraction
and( henceI still  overestimiate  true  economicii  rents  iI  the  tax  base.  The  extent  of the
bias  depends  o01  tlhe im)ortance  of capital  costs in  total  costs.
Some royalties  discriminate  on the  basis of the final use to  which  the  resouirce
is  being  put.  The  most  comrmirionl  levy  of  this  sort  is  an  export  tax  on  resource
products.  Such  export  taxes  differ  from  ipure  rent  taxes  not  only  by  generally
ignoring  extraction  costs  inI defiiiing  the  base,  but  also  by  exeniptinig  resources
which  are  sold  in  the  domestic  market.  The  usual  reason  for  this  forIm  of  tax  is
to  subsidize  dolnestic  users  of  the  resource  p)ro(luct.  As  ntientioned  earlier.  this
p)ractice  ususally is associate(i  with  ind(uistrial poliicy goals  of promoting  downstreaim
processing  industries.  A  coninionly  ised( tax  structure  in  this  regar(d  is one  in  which
the  export  tax  ratc  is  negatively  related  to  the  extent  of  (lornestic  value-added  in
processing  activities.  Whatever  the  justification  for  this  sort  of  tax.  it  is (lear  that
it  (liverges  considerably  froiin a  tax  oIt ecoIIOnmic  relnts.
33Royalties,  therefore,  tend  to  be very imperfect  mechanisms  for the  taxation  of
resource  rents.  We postpone  to  the  following section  a  discussion  of some  of the
adverse  incentive  effects arising fronm  the use of imperfect  rent  taxes  such  as these.
d.  Production  Sharing  and Public  Sector  Equity  Participation
Many  govcrnments  atternpt  to  tax  resource  rents  through  some  form  of more  di-
rect  participation  in  resource  exploitation.  Two of the  most  cormmon methods  are
production  sharing  and  equity  participation.
The simplest  form of production  sharing  arrangement  is one in which  the gov-
ernment  receives  a certain  proportion  of the  output  or of the sales  revenue  from  a
resource  deposit  that  they  have leased  to  an  operator.  This  is just  like a  type  of
crop-sharing  which is commonly  observed  in agricultural  production.  It is formally
identical  to  a crude  (ad  valorem)  royalty  described  in  the  previous  subsection  and
is  a  very  imperfect  rent  tax.  As  with  royalties,  more  complex  produlction  shar-
ing agreements  can be devised in order  to  correct  for the  obvious distortions  of the
crude form.  For instance,  a fixed amount  of the initial  production  might  be reserved
for the  developer  in  order  to  compensate  for capital  and  exploration  costs.  Only
after  that  initial  amount  would production  sharing  with  the  government  begin.  Of
course,  the  extent  to  which  this  actually  covered or exceeded  capital  costs  would
depend  on  the  price  of the  resource  at  the  time  it  was extracted.  And  the  extent
to  which the production  shares  corresponded  to economic rents  (after  capital  costs)
would  depend  on  the  value  of the  developer's  share  relative  to  current  extraction
costs.  In order  to properly  reflect economic rents,  the production  shares  would have
to  vary  with  the  price  of the  resource  and  the  actual  value  of current  extraction
costs.  The latter  would vary across  resource deposits  and  over time  with  any given
deposit.  Production  sharing  agreements,  therefore,  will be  generally  a  very  poor
substitute  for taxes  on resource  rents.
Another  form  of direct  government  participation  is  through  the  purchase  or
granting  of equity  in  a  resource  extraction  operation.  The  extent  to  which  such
arrangements  substitute  for a tax  on resource rents  will depend  on the terms  under
which  the  equity  is acquired.  Suppose  the equity  is acquired  through  governments
coiitributing  to  the  operation's  capital  investment  in  return  for  an  equal  share  of
the  flow of net  current  revenues from  the  resource extraction  operation.  Then  the
returns  that  will accrue  to  the government  could be  thought  of as comprising  two
parts:  a)  its  share  of  the  returns  to  capital  investment,  and  b)  an  equal  share
of  the  resource  rents.  100% government  ownership  would  correspond  to  a  100%
rent  tax,  50% ownership  would  be  equivalent  to  a  50% rent  tax,  and  so on.  The
coexistence  of other  forms of income  and resource  taxes on such joint  venture  firms
would complicate  this  simple  relationship.
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share  of the  capital  investment  of the firm,  then  it will end  up  collecting  a smaller
proportion  of the  rents  by this  method.  In particular,  if the  equity  price  were the
same  as  what  would  be  paid  by  a  new private  investor,  ari(  hence  included  the
capitalized  value of expected  rents,  then  no (ex  ante)  rents  at  all would  accrue  to
the governrment through  its equity  ownership.  Any rents  that  were collected  woul(d
arise  only  because  of differences  b)etween actual  ari(  expected  rents.  These  couldi
be positive  or negative.
Suppose,  as is sometimes  the case, that  the governmnenit  eqluity is obtained  free
of charge,  i.e.  without  any contribi'tion  to the firmn's  capital.  This  free equity  could
be  thought  of as payment  by the  firm for the  rights  to  resource  extraction.  If the
equity  share  were on  the  same  terrns  as if the government  had  invested  i.e.  it
gave  the  rights  to  a certain  proportion  of the  flow of net  current  revenues  of tlle
firm -- then  this  would  be equivalent  to  a tax  on both  resource  rents  andc private
returns  to  capital.  The  only  way to  convert  this  into a  pure  rent  tax  would  be  to
deduct  from the governnment's revenue rights  an imputed  return  to the firm's  capital
investment.
There  are several  other  differences  worth  noting  between  such  equity  or joint
venturing  schemes  and  pure  rent  taxes.  First,  government  participation  is  sorne-
times  seen  to  have  additional  advantages  to  other  foriris of rent  taxes  by  giving
the  government  some voting  power and  hence direct  control  over  the firm's  activi-
ties  and  by  giving  the  government  "a  window"  which  provi(dCs .lluable  inforrmlatioii
pertinent  to  both  taxation  and  other  forms  of regulation  of the  rcsolurce sector.
Second, it  cannot  be automatically  assumned that  revenues accruing  to  government
resource  companies  are  equivalent  to  tax  revenues paid  directly  to  the  state  trea-
sury.  Because of their  greater  indepen(lence  fromii  traditional  government  budgetary
agencies,  resource-rich  state  companies  are  notoriouis for  the  imlanly ways in  whlich
their  spending  patterns  differ from  those  of these other  agencies.  In  marny circIurll-
stances  it  is most  realistic  to  treat  state  resource  firms'  profits  just  likc those  of
other  private  companies.  Then  state  ownership  makes  no  contribution  to  the  gov-
ernment's  efforts  at rent  taxation.  In  fact, the  taxation  of state  companies  is often
more problematic  than  it is for private  companies.
35IV.  THE  COSTS  OF  IMPERFECT  RENT  TAXES
1.  Introduction
Most taxes are levied on proxies or inmperfect substitutes  for the  bases at which they
really  are directed.  This certainly  tends  to be true  of those  oni econonlic rents  from
the, exploitation and  sale of resources.  This  has  iml)licationis both  for government
revenues and for the allocation  of a country's  scarce resources (natural  and other).  A
pure  rent tax  can be levied at  rates of up to  100% without  reducing  the efficiency of
resource  allocation.  However, if the tax base diverges from true economic rent,  then
any tax  on that  base will affect investment  and  other  allocation  decisions of private
agents  and  cause  inefficiencies in  these  decisions  when  viewed from  the  vantage
point  of aggregate  econormic welfare.  The  nature  arid extenit of these inefficiencies
will depend  on  the form of the divergence of the tax  base  from true  econornic  rent.
But  in general  the size of the efficiency cost will depend,  among other  things,  on the
rate  of tax,  or, rmore precisely, on the square  of the tax rate.  As long as tax revenues
are increasing  in  the  tax  rate,  there  will then  be  a trade-off  between  government
revenues  and  efficiency of resource  allocation.  This  is not  true  of a paLre rent  tax.
In  a  world  of imperfect  taxes,  therefore,  it is important  to  understand  the  nature
and  the costs of inefficiencies arising from different methods  of taxing  resource rents.
This  will facilitate  the design of tax systems  that  will best promote  the government's
revenue  goals  while minirmizing the  efficiency costs imposed  oIi the economy.  The
ideal tax system  frorm  this  viewpoint might be expected  to differ across countries  and
even within  countries  depending  on  the  rmix of resource  products  and  the  specific
circumstances  of their  exploitation.
Most  countries  (lo use a  wide variety  of mechanisms  for taxing  resource  rents.
Royalty  formulas  might  differ considerably  across  resource  products.  Partially  or
comipletely pre-paid  leasing  arrangements  might  be used in some sectors  and  not  in
others.  The  same  is true  of governrnent  participation  through  production  sharing
arid/or  (tquity ownership.  Arrangements  sometiries  differ across  firms  within  the
sarne indiistry.  Furtherrnore,  it is the normr rather  than  the exception  for the same
activity  to  be subject  to a number  of different  types  of taxes and  royalties.  Many of
these  differences  in  and  mixtures  of taxes are due  to  historical  accidents  and  other
reasons  that  have little  or nothing  to do with  the design of an efficient or otherwise
appropriate  tax  system.  Nevertheless,  the number  of varieties  and  cornbinations  of
taxes  that  are  possible  for the collection  of economic rents  suggest  the  importance
of understandiing  some of these incentive  effects and  the deterrminanits of their  sig-
nificance  as a guide to the design of resource taxation  systems.  The purpose  of this
section  is to  providc  some insights  into  these  questions.  AIn exhaustive  treatment
of all  these  possibilities  would  be  alnmost impossible  and  riot  particularly  useful.
The  alternativTe that  we attempt  here is to provide  soine general  principles  for the
understanding  of  these  issues  and  some illustrations  of  some interesting  types  of
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Our  perspective  is  generally  that  of looking  at  divergerices  fror  neuetrality  in
taxation.  In  the  absence  of other  distortions  frorn  econormic  efficiency,  a neutral  tax
systern  will also  be efficient.  When  a particular  resource  extraction  activity  involves
significant  externialities,  then  offsetting  non-neutralities  in  the  tax  treatmnent  of thact
activity  might  be  appropriate.  Of  course,  other  types  of regulation  or institutional
inrnovatiori  imiight be  rmuch rnore  effective  and  less costly  nmeans of achieving  the  same
goals.  In  these  cases,  it is still  iimportanit  to un(lerstand(i  the  nature  of the  distortions
that  result  from  different  types  of  taxes.  Without  such  knowledge  the  designi  of
approp)riate  non-neutral  tax  treatmrient  of thalt  activity  woul(l  not  be  possible;  nor
would  a  comparison  of this  with  other  forms  of regulation.
2.  Decisions  Affected  by  Rent  Taxes
Resource  exploitation  involves  a  number  of different  types  of activities.  In  the  case
of non-renewable  resources  these  range  from  exploration  to  extraction  to  processing
to  marketing.  Renewable  resources  involve  all  of  these  types  of  activities  as  well
as  those  related  to  the  long-term  marnagexnent  and  replenishment  of the  resource.
Taxes  and  other  regulations  might  even  determiiie  whether  a resource  is renewable  or
non-  renewable.  The  tax  system  can  affect  decisions  at  all  points  in  the  productioni
process.  The  decisions  which  are  affected  at  any  stage  mtlight involve  the  level  of
the  activity  in  question,  the  input  mix and/or  the  technology  utilized.  the  disposal
of  the  outputs  (marketed  and( non-i-narketed),  and  the  timinlg  of  the  activity.  In
the  rernaining  sections  of this  chapter  we  discuss  some  of these  effects  in  relatior.  to
different  types  of resource  taxes  and  illustrate  a  method  by  which  one  can  measure
their  q,uantitative  importance.
3.  Royalty  Structures
Even  the  best  designed  royalty  systems  are  very  imp)erfect  proxies  for  taxes  on  eco-
ormic renit.  Their  basic  difficulty  is  that  they  ignore  all  capital  costs  involved  inI
resource  exploitation.  In  rmany  cases  they  also  ignore  at  least  sorne  comnponents
of  current  costs  and/or  iniperfectly  account  for  them.  This  means  that  royalties
generally  tend  to  overestimate  economic  rents,  with  the  extent  of  the  divergence
depending  on  the  importance  of  the  underestimated  and/or  ignored  elements  of
costs.  This  will  discourage  at  least  sorne  resource-related  investments.  At  low  rates
of tax  this  mnight not  discourage  inany  socially  desirable  resource  exploitation  activ-
ities.  But  at  higher  rates  of tax  that  might  be  necessary  to  collect  significant  public
revenues,  considerable  amounts  of suclh desirable  investments  might  be  discouraged.
Consider  first  the  effect  of ignoring  capital  costs  in  the  definition  of  the  tax
37base.  The  general  effect of tins  (lefect in (iefining the  base is to bias  the  tax systemn
against  capit al-intensive  resource investrments.  Consider  two resource projects,  both
of which  have the same  net present  value of cash  flows over their  lifetimrie,  but  onr
of  whicli has a  much  higher  level of capital  costs  which  are offset  by higher  sales
revenues at  the  timne  of marketing  the product.  The  more capital-intensive  of these
l)ro)jects would( be  subject  to  miiuclh  higher  royalty  payments  over its  lifetime  thai
the other.  Despite  the fact that  the projects  are equally  socially desirable  (froml the
efficiency viewpoint),  the niore capital-intensive  project  wouldl be rmtuch  iess likely to
be undertaken.  The royalty  system  creates  a distortion  by driving a wedge between
the  returns  of marginal  investments  of (lifferent capital  intensities.
In  the  case  of  nion-renewable  resources,  for  instance,  this  woul(d discoutrage
projects  with relatively  high exploration  costs.  With renewable  resources,  this  would
create  a  distortion  against  projects  with  high  replenishment  costs.  It  would  bias
forest  activities  in  favor  of imininlg  of the  natural  forest  and  against  cutting  pro-
gramns involving  significanit silvicultural  rnanagemnent or the  developmlent of planta-
tion forests.
The  nono-deductibility of capital  costs is especially  harmiful when  the effects of
the royalty  system  are considered in conjunction  with  those of corporate  taxes.  The
treatrnent  of capital  costs in royalty  systems  means that  royalties  are taxes  not only
on  econormic rents,  butt also oII capital  income  derived  from  resource  exploitation
activities.  Corporate  taxes are also levies on capital  incomne. The combined  effect of
these two different taxes,  therefore,  is double taxation  of capital  income.  Relative  to
other  sectors,  therefore,  the imiipositioni  of royalty  paymiients  discourages  investment
in resource  proje(c(ts.
The effects of the inismeasurement  of elements of current  costs in a royalty  sys-
teIn can  oc thought  of in  a sirmilar fashion.  First,  the exclusion  of current  costs,  as
is (lone in  the crudest  forrn of royalty  system,  also overestimates  rents  and,  at least
at  higlh rates  of tax,  discourages  socially  desirable  resource  exploitation  projects.
Second,  such  systems  create  a  distoitionl against  projects  which  are  relatively  in-
tensive  in  the  use  of currelnt  inl)uts  which  are  excluded  firom considerationi  in  the
base.  Consi(dcr two projects  or activities  of the  sarne pre-tax  net present  value  and
which  are sirnilar  in every other  respect  except  that  one is nmore  intensive  in  some
current  inpuit whose costs  are not  taken  into  account  in calculating  the base  of the
royalty.  Because  the costs of that  input  cannot  be deducted  froni the  tax base,  this
project  or  activity  will be  subject  to  higher  royalty  payments,  and  hence  will be
disfavoured  by  the tax  systerm.
The  most  cornlllon  manifestation  of this  sort  of (listortion  is the phenomlenon
knowii  as "high  gra(iing"  of a resource deposit.  In the presence  of a royalty  system
which  provides  a fixed (possibly  zero) allowance for current  costs in  determination
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high  values  and/or  low  costs  an(d ignore  high-cost  and/or  low-value  deposits  or
parts  of deposits  that  still  hav'' positive  social  value.  Despite  their  positive  social
value,  the  royalty  system  discoureges  their  extraction  by charging  a  tax  in  excess
of the  ret  current  revenues fromri  their  extraction.  Such  systems  encourage  forest
concessionaires  to  cut  only  the  high-vainid stems  inI a stand  and  leave  b(h *n(d and
often  even  darnage  or  destroy  smaller  stems  of significant  social  value.  Similarly,
mining  operators  are encouraged  to  close (lowrn rrines  before  all socially  valuable
deposits  have been extracted.
4.  Export  Taxes
An export  tax  bears  a ciose resemblance  to a crude royalty  and  has all of the  same
efficiency costs,  In  addition,  it  discrimninates between  resources  marketed  dormesti-
cally and  those  sold in the world market.  If a resource has no outlet  in  the domestic
market,  there  is  no  additional  efficiency cost  due  to  this  form  of discrimrination.
However,  this  is seldom the  case.  When  resources  can be  sold in  the local  market,
an export  tax induces  them  to be sold at a lower tax there  than  in export  markets.
Rents  become  dissipated  by selling  the  resources  at  below world  niarket  prices  to
domestic  users.  The loss of governiment revenues  arising from  the use of an  export
tax  rather  than  an equivalent  royalty  on all sales, export  and  domestic,  is propor-
tional  to the size of the  dornestic rnarket.  The efficiency cost depends  on the size of
the  tax  and  on the  elasticity  of domestic  demand.
The only case in which this efficiency argument  against  export  taxes  might  not
apply  is when  the  country  is sufficiently large  in the world  market  for the  resource
in  question  that  it  has  some  monopoly  power in  that  market.  In this  case there
is an  optimal  export  tax  which is inversely related  to  the elasticity  of world  excess
dernand  for  the product.  A general  observation  that  is relevant  here  is that  world
markets  for rnost resource  products  generally  tend  to be much more elastic  than  is
claimed  by  the  proponents  of optimal  export  taxes.  This  is especially  true  in  the
longer run when other  sources of supply become available and  users are able to adapt
to  higher  prices  through  various  forms  of substitution.  The  second  observation  is
that  an  optimal  export  tax  is riot a substitute  for other  taxes  to  collect  economic
rents.  An ideal  export  tax facilitates  the collection  on.y of the  rents  arising  from  a
country's  monopoly  position  in  world  markets.  The  rents  arising  from  differences
between  the  competitive  price  of a resource  and  the  costs  of its  extraction  are left
untouched  by an  optimal  export  tax.
A common  reason  for using  an export  tax  rather  than  a  uniform  royalty  is to
promote  the development  of downstream  processing  industries.  An export  tax  gives
domestic  processors  access to the raw material  at a price that  is less than  that  faced
39by foreign processors, with the gal) cqual  not only to the  cost of transporting  the
resource to  the foreign plant,  but also the size of the export tax.  The aniotulit of
the subsidy provided to (lornestic users depends on the rate of the export tax an(d
on the importance of the resource in  total  processing costs. This formii  of subsidy
gives rise to several types of inefficiencies. First,  to  the extent  that  this effective
protection is actuially  necessary to encourage (lornestic  processing oy imiarginal  firms,
it substitutes  high cost ways of earning or saving foreign  exchange (exporting locally
processed raw  mraterials) for lower cost ways of doing the  same thiirg (exporting
the unprocessed resource). Resource rents arnl government revenues, in effect, are
(lissip)ated  in  the  sul)sidization  of inefficient  marginal  domestic  producers.  Second,
b)y  artificially lowering the domestic cost of natural  resource inl)uts, export  taxes
induce local producers  to l)e wasteful in  the use of these raw materials.  Plywood
and saw mills in countrieF with significant exl)ort restrictions on logs, for instance,
tenid to have much lower log recovery  rates than do rnills in log importirig countries.
5.  Concessions  and  Leasing Arrangements
Tlihe  leasing of concessions  to a natural resource deposit can yield revenues which are
identical to the ex ante rent froin that  resource. As mrientioned  earlier, however, it
is important  that  the ler.gth of the lease correspond to the useful life of the deposit.
Most governmerricts  are reluctant  to enter into sufficiently long-term leases for this
purpose.  This generally mcans that lease revenucs will be less than what could have
been collected otherwise.
In the  case of noil-renewable resources, the short  term of the  lease makes it
difficult for operators  'to e:ctract all the  usable resources from the  project.  This
leads therm to offer a lower bid1  for the concession. It also induces them to Cagage
in inefficieiit mining practices ainmed  at speeding up the extraction  process.  This
gernerally  reduces the value of the deposit to potential future operators.  Even if the
currenit operators have a right of first refusal on future leases, political and other
uncertainties will cause theim to discount this possibility and to shorteni their timne
horizons in  planning current  activities.  Therefore, short-term leases, even when
offered consecutively, will generally yield less revenues than  long term  leases for
iorn-rernewable  resource deposits.
The sanc  will generally be true in the case of renewable resouirces.  However,  in
this  case short-term leases rmight  yield much greater  revenues over the early years
of exploitation  than would be obtained from perpetuai leases. The rcason is that
short-terrm I.ases give the  operator very little  incentive to engage in  investments
in replenishment or renewal of the resource. In these circumstances, the operator
would sirnply rninc the first generationl  or rotation of the resource stock (assumirng
that  this was the length of the lease) without regard for the consequences  for future
40generations  or rotations.  Therefore.  short-terrn  "rents"  might be much greater  than
with  a long-term  lease holder,  and renters  might  be willing to pay  quite  high prices
for short-term  leases.  But,  of course,  what  appear  as rents  to  the short-term  lease
holder are largely  postponed  investments  in replenishment  ari(/or  the  destrtlction
of much  of  the  potential  for longer  term  rents.  The  present  value  of the  future
stream  of all rents  that  could be received would certainly  be less with  a successicon
of short-term  leases than  with  one perpetual  lease in  the presence of these  sorts  of
incentives.  The  b)urden on other  typtes of regulation  of lease-holder  behavior  is very
great  when leases for renewable  resources  are relatively  short.
6.  Measuring  the  Distorting  Effect  of Taxes
Up to now our  discussion of the effect of resource  taxes has been largely  qualitative
in  nature.  For some purposes  it rmay be  desired to obtain  iuarntitative measures  of
the extent  to which different  tax instruments  distort  decisions.  A conventional  tool
for doing  so is the use of marginal  effective  tax  rates.  These were initially  devised as
ways of measuring  the size of the distortion  irnposed  by capital  income  taxes  on the
decision  to  invest  in  depreciable  capital.  However, they  can be  used  to  tax  we(dge
imposecl on virtually  any capital  decision, and  have been applied  to  such things  as
inventory  holding  and  non-renewable  resource exploitation.  Since the methodology
for calculating  marginal  effective tax rates is somewhat  technical,  we have relegated
it to  an  Appendix.  It  can be oInitted  without  loss of continuity.  In  the  Appendix,
we illustrate  the  use of marginal  effective tax  rates  in  the  non-renewable  resource
context,  concentrati.,  on  capital  investment  ard  extraction  decisions.  We do so
for  fairly  simple  examplc,  ignoring  such important  comiplications as  risk  and  the
absence  of full loss offsetting.
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1.  Introduction
We conclude  this  review by summarizing  some of its  implications  for resource  tax
policy.  It  is useful  to  begin by briefly recalling  the  role of resource  taxes  and  their
place in the  system  of taxes.  Resource  taxes are part  of the overall  system  of taxe!s
which impinge  upon  the  incomes of businesses.  The systerm usually  includes  direct
taxes of a general  natulre such as the corporation  income tax  and  taxes  on personal
and  uni  corporated  business  income,  indirect  taxes  of various  sorts  including  sales
and  excise taxes  as well as export  and import  duties,  and  taxes specifically  designed
for resource  industries.
The  system  of income  taxes  is intended  to  tax  capital  and  personal  income
of residenits and,  where  possibl,  of non-residents  earning  income  in the  country  of
taxation.  Such systems  typically include  both  a personal  tax system  and a corporate
tax  system.  The  corporate  tax  system  ought  to  be viewed as supplemnentary to  the
personal  tax,  that  is, as a withholding  tax on capital  inicome earned  in corporations.
It  essentially  ensures  that  equity  income  earned  in the  corporation  is taxed  as it is
earned,  whether  or not  it is distributed.  Many countries  recognize this  withholding
role  by  integrating  the  corporate  tax  with  the  personal  tax  system  through  the
use of rneasures  such  as dividend  tax  credits  or dividend  paid  deductions  from  the
corporate  tax base.  This essentially  ensures that  double taxation  of equity  income is
rnitigated.  In the case of foreign corporations,  the corporate  tax also facilitates  a tax
transfer  from  foreign treasuries  in  cases in which foreign governmnents offer foreign
tax  credits.  Host country  tax  systems are often (or should be)  designed  with  this in
mnind. Interest  income  tends  to be  taxed  at  the personal  level since withholding  is
not  necessary  here.  Income  taxes,  if designed  properly,  tax  all capital  incorne on  a
uniform basis, including  Loth the noimal  return  to capital  and any rents.  Of course,
the design  of many  tax  systems  is imperfect  in the  sense that  this  uniforrnity  is not
achieved.
One  of tlhe ways in which  non-uniformity  is evident  is in the  treatment  of re-
source  industries.  In most  countries  the  capital  income  tax  system  treats  resource
industries  quiite favourably  relative  to other  industries.  This  occurs  mainly  because
of the favourable  treatment  afforded  various  capital  expenses  which  are specific  to
the resource industrie~s. For example, scme items of a capital  i,ature  are given rapidA
write  offs in tax  systems  which  are meant  to be  abiding  by the  accrual  method  of
accounting.  These incluide the costs of acquiring  resource properties  and exploration
and  development  expenditures.  Furthermore  do01ble  write-offs  are  often  given by
virtue  of deletion  allowances for resources  used tip.  And mnany  developing  countries
have traditionally  given generous  incerntives in the form of tax holidays.  investment
tax  credits.  (lity  exemptions  on  irnported  equipment.  an(d valuable  loss  carry  for-
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is often  undertaxed  relative  to  other  industries.  Some  corporate  tax  systenms also
allow deductions  for resource taxes  paid.  To the extent  that  this  is the case, it viti-
ates  the effect of the  resource  tax.  To the extent  that  it is desirable  to supplement
general  income  taxes  witb  resource taxes,  this is undesirable.
The  case for special  reso'  -ce taxes  is precisely  to  tax  resource  rents  over  and(
above  the  levies  that  are  implicit  in  general  income  taxes.  There  are  two  sorts
of  arguments  for  this.  One  is  the  efficiency-based  argument  that  resource  rents
are non-distorting  and  therefore  are  an  ideal  source  of revenue  from  an  efficiency
point  of view.  The  other  one,  which is complementary,  is that  the  property  rights
to  resources  ought  to  accrue  to  the  public  at  large  rather  than  to  private  citizens
since they represent  the bounties  nature  has bestowed  on the  economy rather  than
a  reward  for econiomic effort  of some sort.  This  can  be viewed as a  sort  of equiity
argument.  However,  one  must  be  careful  in  applying  it.  In  an  economy  with,
no resource  taxes,  the  value  of known  stocks  of resources  will be  capitalized  into
existing  property  values  at  least  to  some extent.  If a government  then  imposes  a
new resource  tax,  the  incidence  of the tax  will fall on the existing  property  owners
or  lease holders.  Thus,  there  will be  redistributive  effects to  b)e accounted  for.  If
the  government  is the  principal  owner of the resource  properties,  this  will be  rnmlch
less of an  issue, except  to  the extent  that  they  have leased  the  resources  on a long
term  basis  at  a predetermined  price that  reflects  the pre-resource-tax  value of the
rerts.
In our  view, the main  rcason  for taxing  resources  over and  above that  of other
general  tax rneasures  is .precisely to acquire  for the public sector a share of the rents
generated  froml resources.  In principle,  special rent taxes could be irpi)osed on other
sectors.  However,  the  argument  is strongest  for resource  indlustries sill(ce  those  are
where  economiic rents  are imost likely to reside.
Given  that  the  main  purpose  of resource  taxation  is to  capture  rents.  the ap-
propriate  form of taxation  is one whose l)ase is econorrmic  rents.  We reiterate  b)elow
the form  that  mighlt take.  For now we sirnply note  that  actual  resource  taxes secIn
to  differ from  rent  taxes  in  signi.icant  ways.  Unlike with  the  gerneral income  tax
which includes  provisions  which allow the resource iII(lllstries to  un(lerstate  cap)ital
income,  resource  taxes  often  overstate  rents.  This  is  becalise  they  frequently  (io
not  offer full deductions  for all costs,  particularly  capital  costs.  Somne  systems  tax
revenues  without  giving any  deduction  for costs;  others  allow current  costs  to  be
deducted.  As a  consequence.  they  discourage  investmneint  activity  in  the  resource
industries,  encourage  the  exploitation  of highl gra(les of resources  at  the cxpense  of
low grades,  and  rnake it  (lifficuilt to  impose  highl ta.i  rates  for fear  of makirng the
marginal  tax  rate  greater  than  100%/(.
432.  Policies  for  Capturing  Resource  Rents
As we have discussed  earlier,  there  are  three  alternative  ways for the  governmernt
to divert  a share  of rents  to  the public  sector.  They  are as follows:
a.  Cash Flow or Cash Flow Equivalent  Taxes
The ideal  sort  of rent  tax is a tax oni the real cash  flows of resource  firims. For noii-
renewable  resource  firims, the  base  would include  all revenues  oII a  cash  basis  less
all current  and  capital  costs including  costs of acquiring  resource properties,  explo-
ration  expenses,  developmient expenises and  any processing expenses  incurred  by the
resource firm.  For renewable  resource firms, sirmilar costs would be deducted  includ-
ing costs  of property  rights,  harvestiilg  costs,  any  renewal costs  such as replanting
or restocking,  as well as  any  processing  costs  done  by the  firm.  There  should  be
no deductions  for other  taxes paid.  Of course,  cash flow accounting  should  be done
from  a  social  point  of  view so any  external  costs  should  be  included  as  costs  on
a  cash  basis.  It  may  also  be  necessary  to  require  the  firm  to  cover  the  external
cost  associated  with  shutting  down, though  that  may be  done  by forcing  firrmls  to
post  bonds  and/or  through  other  forms of regulation.  Both  corporations  ard  unin-
corporated  firms  should  be subject  to  the  tax.  This  is a relatively  straightforward
type  of  tax  to  administer,  though  there  are likely  to  be  incentives  to  evade.  For
example,  there  is an incentive  to cngagc in transfer  pricing  for vertically-integrated
firms  as  a  way  of passing  rents  forward  to  non-resource  firmls.  (Note,  however,
there  is no  (lisadvantage  to  extending  the  base as far  forward  as is necessary  for a
vertically-integrated  firrm since if there  are no  X  ts  downstream,  there  will be  no
tax  collected.)  As well, there  is an  incentive  to  have capital  income  masquera(ling
as wage and( salary payments  to avoid the tax.  These are inevitable  consequences  of
a tax  which applies  differentially  to sonle activities  ani( not  to others.  In principle,
the  cash  flow tax rate  couldl be extremely  high,  approachilg  100%.
The  public  sector  rnay  balk  at  a  full-fledged  cash  flow tax  since it  generally
implies  that  tax  liabilities  will be  negative  for giowing  firms.  Althouigh the  cash
flow implications  of these  mrray  be  beneficial  for the  firms.  governinents  can  raise
tax  revenues  only  with  some  welfare  cost  and  they  may  prefer  a  system  which
smnooths tax  receipts  into  the  future.  Such  a  compromiise is easily  achieved  with
a  imodified cash-flow  tax  base  in  which  the  firm caII capitalize  cost  deduictiorns ir
a straightforward  way.  In particular.  any  costs which  are capitalized  receive a full
noiminal interest  (leduiction based on the full book value of the c)apitalized cost  The
rate  of (lepreciatiorn used for  capitalization  purposes  is  arbitrary.  It  mlay well be
chosern by the  firimi  sulbject to the constraint  that  tax  liabilities  caninot be negative.
Suich  a  systemn  is  equivalent  to  oIne in  which  negative  tax  liabilities  are  carried
forward  at  full interest.  It is therefore  equivalent  to a straight  cash  flow tax  base.
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Rents  may be transferred  to the public sector by requiring  firms to bid for the rights
to  exploit  resources.  In  the  case  of rion-renewable  resources,  this  would  occur  prior
to  the  exploration  stage.  For renewable  resources,  the  bid  would  be for  a  known
stock  of resources.  As long as the  bidding system  were competitive  and( all bidders
were equally  well informed,  the  value of the  bid woul(l bte equal to  expected  future
net  rents  (net  of future  expecte(d taxes)  corrected  for  a  risk factor.  Furthermore,
to  exnsure that  optirnal  rents  were obtained,  the  property  rights  obtained  mrust be
perpetual.  If they were for a fixed terrm, there woul(l be an incentive for the operator
to extract  the  resource  inefficiently.
Even  with  a  well-functiorinig  auction,  the  consequences  can  differ from  that
under  a rent  tax.  For one thing,  the auction  will yield  100% of the expected  value
of the  rents  to  the  bidder,  whereas  the  tax  rate  may b)e less than  that.  Under  an
auction,  the  cash  flow consequences  are much different  as well.  Net  rents  rnust  be
entirely  paid  up front,  whereas  with  taxes  they  are  spread  out  into  the  future.  If
there  are  any  capital  market  constraints,  this  will be  reflected  in  the  size of  the
bid.  Also, the  risk  effects can  be  different.  Under  the  auction  system,  the  firm is
forced  to bear  the  risk associated  with  resource exploitation  whereas  with  the  cash
flow tax  the  public  sector  shares  the  risk.  To the extent  that  the  public  sector  is
better  able  to  pool  or  spread  risk,  the  outcorne  may  be more  efficient.  Of co Irse
one  important  reason  why the  public  sector  may  be  better  at  dealing  with  risk  is
that  some  of the  risk facing  the  operator  is the  risk of higher  taxes  in  the  fuiture.
The  time  inconsistency  which gives rise  to this  will be more severe under  a  system,
such  as  an  auction,  which  captures  rents  tup  front.  Thus  while  this  risk  makes  it
more  approp)riate  to  use  an  auction  system,  it  also  reduces  the  price  that  bidders
will be willing to  pay  for a long term  lease.
The auction  mnay  be inefficient for various reasons.  If bidding is not comnpetitive.
it will not  be efficient.  Also, if the auctioni requires  firnis to  l)idl  not  only oII a once
and  for all payment  but  also onl a future  royalty  payment,  the  outcorne  will not  be
efficient since the  firm will be induced  to behave  inefficiently in  the futuire.
c.  Public  Sector Equity  Participatioz
Finally,  the  public  sector  may obtain  a  share  of the  rents  by taking  on  a  share  of
equity  in the firm in particular  ways. Onc way of doing  so is for the government  to
contribute  to  a share  of the  costs of exploiting  a resource  anr( claim an  equivalent
share  of the  equity  of the firni.  This  woul(d be finaincial exactly  the  same as a cash
flow tax,  tholughl  perhaps  more difficult to implement.  The public sector would have
to identify  both  the  cash costs  and the  revenues acctruing on the relevant  operation
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actually  does become  a full partner  in the ownership  of the firm, it presumably  has
a say  in  the  decision-lakirng  responsibilities  that  come with  share  ownership.  As
well, it may  be privy  to  information  that  it would otherwise  not  obtain.  This  is in
contrast  with  cash  flow taxation  where the  government  is a silent  partner.
The  above  method  involves the  government  providing  cash  up front  and( ob-
tairirig  revenues in thc futulre. The governiment could become  an equity  participant
while avoiding  these  cash  flow consequences  for itself.  Instead  of providing  money
up  front,  it  could deduict its  share  of the costs  later  oIn against  dividends.  This  is
referred  to as acquiiring free equity. As long as the costs were appropriately  deducted
with  interest  the schemne  would be financially  equivalent  to  the cash-flow equivalent
schemes outlined  earlier.
As with  taxation  but  in contrast  to auctions,  equity  participation  schemes will
divert  less than  100% of the  rents  to the public  sector.  Furthermore,  there  may  be
an  issue in  the case of foreign firrmis  of the extent  to which foreign tax credits  can be
clairned  against  horrme  country  governrments.  Of course,  that  may be  an  issue with
resource  taxes  as well.
3.  How  Actual  Policies  Differ  frora True  Rent  Collection  Devices
Revenue-raising  policies actually  used differ from  those  outlined  above in  their  de-
signl. This implies that  they are not pure rent collecting devices, but  distort  decision-
makinlg as well. There  may be  various reasons  for this,  some of which involve other
policy objectives  by the government  (e.g., capital  income taxation,  protection,  etc.).
However. it is also possible  that  policy mnakers  are ill-informed  about  the proper  de-
sign of rent  collecting  devices, or that  purely  political  factors  are at  work.  Rather
than  secon(l guiessing the  reasons,  we sinmply  discuss the  ways in which actual  mea-
sures  deviate  froml optima]  rent-collecting  instruments.  We concenitrate largely  on
measiures sp)ecific to the  resource industries.
a.  Tax  Mcasure.s
Historically.  it  has  been  the  exception  rather  than  the  rule  that  rent  taxes  have
bleen  used  in  the  resource  induistries.  Indeed,  there  are very  few  examples  of  cash
flow type  taxes.  We consider  the  various  taxes  in  turn.
i.  RIoyalties/St  umpage  Feoes/Severance  Taxes.
I)erhaps  the  rnost  conimoni  formn of  resource  charge  has  been  a  levy  based  on  the
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renewable  resources  and  a  stumpage  fee in  forestry.  It  is  difficult  to  understand
the  attraction  of this  type  of charge  apart  from  simplicity.  Sometimes  these  levies
have  been  viewed less as a form  of tax  than  as  a fee charged  by the  public  sector
for  removing  resources  from  public  or  Crown lands.  However,  from  an  economic
point  of view, they  are equivalent  to  a production  tax.  In their  simple  form,  they
tax  revenues  with  no  accounting  for costs.  As such,  they  act  as a disincentive  for
investment  and  extraction  of resources  and  coincidentally  generate  less revenue  for
the  public  sector  than  could be obtained  by a rent  tax.  Furthermore,  since no ac-
count  is taken  of costs,  they  discriminate  against  high-cost  revenue  sources  at  tlle
expense  of low-cost  ones.  This  effect of crude  royalty  systems  is generally  known
as high-grading  of the resource.  In the  case of mines, socially valuable  but  high  ex-
traction  cost  deposits  are left in  the ground.  In selective logging operations,  lower
value stems  are left unharvested  and  are often damaged  and left to rot  in the forest.
Also, since costs  are not  deducted,  they  do not  serve as risk-sharing  devices by the
public  sector,  nor do they  provide any assistance  with the cash flow of firms as is the
case with  other  measures.  Against  this  must  be  set  the fact  that  production  taxes
may have a role in  correcting  for externalities  associated  with  resource  production.
However, this  would not  justify  their  use as primary  revenue  collection  devices.
The  effect  of production  taxes  can differ according  to  whether  the  tax  rate  is
based  on quantity  produced  (per  unit  tax)  or  upon  the  selling price  (ad valorem).
In  principle,  an  ad  valorem  rate  can  always  be  chosen  such  that  it  is equivalent
to  a  given  per  unit  rate.  However,  when  prices  are  changing,  maintaining  that
equivalence  would require  constantly  changing  the tax  rate.  If the tax  rates  remain
fixed  while prices  change,  the  two will have  different  effects.  In particular,  when
prices  rise,  the  ad valorem  tax  rate  rises  relative  to  the  per  unit  and  vice  versa.
This  implies  that  the  ad valorem tax  has some risk-sharing  effect that  the per  unit
does  not  have,  and  in  periods  of rising  resource  taxes,  it  discourages  investinent
inore.  Similarly,  when  the  quality  of a resource  varies within  a given deposit  (e.g.
less rich ore  seams  in a mine,  and  different  tree  species within  any  part  of a forest
concession),  maintaining  equivalence  between  an  ad valorem  and  specific  tax  rate
woi!ld  require  different  per  unit  rates  for  different  parts  of  the  deposit  which  is
extracted.
Several  countries  have moved  away from  simple  per  unit  royalty  systems  and
export  taxes  in recent  decades.  These  include  Bolivia and  Indonesia  for hard  min-
erals,  Colombia  for oil, and  Jamaica  for bauxite.  Sabah  and  Indonesia  have  also
moved  in  a  sinmilar direction  in  the  case of tropical  timber  by varying  the  royalty
rate  by type  of tree  species.
Increasingly,  royalty  schemes have been designed to be more sophisticated  than
simple production  taxes.  There  are two main ways in which this  has been done.  For
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has  refined its  tropical  timber  royalties  by allowing a deduction  mearnt to  represent
presumlptive  logging  costs.  This  goes  part  way  towards  rmaking royalties  reflect
rents.  The  other  method  is to  mnake  the  royalty  rate  itself a  sliding scale based  on
either  resource  prices (an  excess price tax) or on the quality  of the  resource.  Thesc
are  sometimes  referred  to  as  windfall  taze.q reflecting  the  fact  that  purpose  has been
seen  as  a  way  of  crearring  off  resource  rents  generate(l  by  p)rice  increases.  Such
slidirng  royalty  systems  have  been  use(d for  oil  (Peru  and(  Malaysia  for  examl)le)
tropical  timnber (Sabah)  coal  (Indonesia)  and  tin  (Malaysia).  Again,  this  is  an
imperfect  way of taxing  resource rents  in general,  although  the procedlure of basing
royalties  on price  can succeed  in obtaininlg changes  in rents  frorn existinig resource
firms  who  have  benefited  fromn all  unexpected  inicrease  in  price.  However,  this  is
donie  at  the  expense  of  discouraging  incremlental  investrments.  The  latter  can  be
mitigated  in  some  instarnces  by  basing  the  royalty  rate  differentially  on  new  and
existing  resource  properties.  Such  a  procedure  will  work  only  once.
ii.  Income-Based  Taxes
Resource  properties  are  usually  subject  to  general  income  taxes.  However,  in  some
instances,  taxes  specific  to  the  resource  industries  are  also  based  on  some  measure
of income.  In  such  cases,  the  tax  is  often  designed  in  simitlar  ways  to  the  general
income  tax  and  has  built  into  it  some  of the  same  biases.  That  is,  it  affords  rapid
write-offs  for  ac(quisition  costs,  exploration  and( development,  and  often  gives  a  de-
pletion  allowance.  Althouiglh  this  generates  somlle  revenues,  it  also  has  the  effect  of
providing  a  sulbsidy  to  mlarginial projects.  That  is,  average  tax  rates  are  positive
while  marginal  tax  rates  are  negative.  Furthermore,  the  way  such  taxes  have  been
irnplemrente(d  in inost  developing  coluntries  (e.g.  for  coal  in  Coloibia  and  hard  min-
erals  in  Indoniesia)  the  rate  of return  to  c(uity  at  which  they  becorne  effective  has
tended  to  be  extreiriely  higlh.  Thlus  th(y  have  not  been  very  effective  collectors  of
(w.oCess  profits  or  rents.
We  have  outlined  earlier  lhow incomne-based  taxes  could  be  designed  to  reflect
economic  rents.  using  a  mo(lifie(d cash-flow  approaclh.  However,  such  systersl  have
not  been  used.  E]lements  of  cash  flow  taxation  have  appeared  in  sorme developed
countries.  For  exainpic.  the  mnininig  tax  regime  in Alberta,  Cana(la  has  the  following
features.  It  is  basically  a  cash  flow  tax  excc)t  that  a  royalty  is  also  applied  until
capital  and  start-ii)  costs  have  all  becn  deducted.  A  sirmilar  system  is used  by  the
Canadian  government  to  tax  oil an(l gas oII federal  Crown  lands.  Thls,  the  principle
of  cash  flow  taxation  has IIot1 been  completely  ruled  ouit.  However,  these  systerns
are  not  fully  efficicnt  since  they  deny  the  full tax  advantages  of expensing  all  capital
costs.
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Some  tax  regimes  impose  an  annual  rental  fee or  charge  for  the  use  of resource
properties.  This  is often done  in  the case of tinmber concessions  anid plantations  in
states  of Malaysia.  If their  rates  were such as to reflect the true  capital  value of the
properties  being  used,  they  woutld be like a  rent  tax.  However, they  are  typically
set  at  arbitrary  and  more or less noriinal  rates.  It  woul(  l)c difficult to  administer
such  a  tax  based  on  the  true  econornic  value of the  resource  property  in question
since  market  values  (1o not  exist.  Thlus, some  ad(miniistrative discretiorl  would( be
required.  If an annual rent  tax  is to  be charged  it seeimis  preferable  to use a proper
rent  tax.
iv.  Export  Taxes
Export  taxes  are  frequently  used  in  developing  countries  as  a  source  of  revenue
from  primary  resources.  In primary  product  exporting  countries,  they  have been  a
major  source  of government  revenue.  In  the  case in which  the  counitry is  a price
taker  on  international  inarkets,  an  export  tax  has  exactly  the  same  effect  as  a
production  tax  from the point  of view of the  pro(lucers.  However, consumers  pay  a
lower price under  the export  tax.  There  may therefore  be sorne distribtutive  reasons
for preferring  an  export  tax,  though  it may  be rnore for  reasons  of administrative
simplicity.  However,  countries  have  foun(d that  export  taxes  on  many  resource
products  (e.g.  rubber  in  Malaysia)  have been  quiite regressive and  have  tended  to
eliminate  these  taxes  in favor of other  iiiore general  taxes  oII spending  and  incorme.
In  maniy cases,  domestic  consumption  is a  small  proportion  of prodluction  an(d so
the differences  in  the revenue implicationis of production  and  export  taxes  rmay not
be great.  However, the  efficiency costs arising  froin diverting  high  value resources
to  lower  value  domnestic uses  d(epends not  on the  absolute  value  of (lornestic  use
relative  to exports,  bLut  rather  on the resporisive of domestic dermiand(I  to price changes
cause(1  by  the  export  tax.  Taxes  on  exports  to  induce  local  (lowristrearli  processing
induistries  can  also  he  a  very  costly  way  of  dissipating  resource  rents.  Even  in
cases  where  the  resource-exporting  country  mright  lhave a  lotne  terni  comparative
advantage  in further  processing,  the  use of export  taxes  to  speced ui) the  process  can
be  very  costly.
The  same  shortcomnings  of production  taxes  as  rent  collectors  appl)y to  export
taxes.  OIn the  other  hand,  export  taxes  mnay be  justified  if  the  couniitry  has  some
monopoly  power  in  world  markets  by  the  usual  optimial  tariff  argumnents.  If so.  that
would  be  a  separate  nustificatiorn  for  export  taxes  over  and( above  rent  collection
devices.
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We have listed  auction  systems  earlier as one of the  ways in which rents  can be ex-
tracted  from  resource producers  up front.  However, they  tend  not  to be used  miuch,
especially  in  developing  countries.  Presumably  one  reason  is that  the  conditions
do not  lend  themselves  to  competitive  bidding  procedures.  Many resource  projects
are large  and  may  not  involve more than  one  different  investor  at  the  same  time.
For whatever  reasons,  individual  deals are struck  with  resource producers  involving
different  types  of public  participation.  These  can take  various  forms  as discussed
next.  One  feature  of such  contracts  which distinguishes  them  from  other  arrange-
ments  is  that  they  tend  to  involve  a  major  element  of administrative  discretion.
That  may  be viewed as a drawback from an economic point  of view when compared
with  schemes  for which eligibility  and  conditions  are rnon-discretionary.
c.  Production  Sharing
There  are  various  non-tax  ways in  which  governments  acquire  shares  of the  pro-
ceeds of resource  projects.  Two common  methods  are  by sharing  of the  output  of
production  and  government  acquisition  of equity  shares  in resource  firms.  Variants
of the  first  of these  is considered  here.
The  simplest  case is  that  in  which  the government  imply  takes  a given share
of the  product.  The  analogy  would be  a system  of share  cropping  in agriculture  in
which  a landowner  allows a  tenant  to  farm  a plot  of land  in return  for a  share  of
the  crop  produced.  The  basic scheme is identical  to  an  ad valorem production  tax
at  the  same  rate.  It  differs from  a tax  on pure  rent  since no costs  are  deducted.
Since it is  ad valorem,  sonic risk-sharing  is implicit  in  the scheme.
Since production  sharing  schemes are subject  to negotiation,  the proportion  of
sharing  could  vary from  project  to project.  In this  way some account  can be  taken
of different  potential  rents.  However, as long as costs  are  not  explicitly  deducted,
such  schemes will not  reflect pure  rents.
Some schemes account  for costs partially  by having  the production  sharing  cut
in  only  after  some  minimum  guarantee  level  of revenues  for  the  firm  (e.g.  oil in
Indonesia).  As  well as allowing  the firm  to cover some  part  of initial  costs  before
sharing  its  output,  this  provides  an  additional  measure  of risk-sharing.  However,
even if the  mninimum were set  such  that  total  costs were covered,  there  would  still
be  a  marginal  disincentive  involved  in  such  schemes  once the  production  sharing
begins  to  apply.
A variant  on production  sharing  is a requirement  that  a certain  proportion  of
production  be  "made  available"  to  the domestic  market.  If such local  market  sales
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then  some  rents  will be  transferred,  and  it will be  similar  to  a  simple  production
sharing  arrangement.  Of course,  if  the  sales  at  subsidized  prices  are  to  private
traders,  the  rents  will not  accrue  to  the  public  sector.  Lack of clear  specification
of the  terms  of such  sales in  the local rnarket  (including  the price  and  thc  eligible
buyer)  can  be  a  source  of contention  with  resource  investors  (e.g.  aluiriinlum in
Indonesia).
d.  Equity  Participation
Finally,  governments  mray negotia-te  to  adopt  cquity positions  in  resource  firims.
Again,  this  can take  various  forms,  and  the  ability  to  obtain  rents  depends  upon
the  form  taken.  At  one extreme,  the  governrment could siinply  p)urchase shares  of
a resource  firm on the open  market.  Divestiture  of a given proportion  of shares  to
local investors  within  a specified time  period is a standard  condition  of foreign hard
mnineral investments  in  Indonesia.  The  government  has  often  put  forward  as  an
obvious  investor  in such  circumstances.  Since the market  valuc of the  firm should
capitalize  all expected  future  net  rents  of the  firin, this  would not  be  expected  to
yield any  net revenues to  the government.  All it would do is to provide the govern-
ment  with whatever  decision-making  authority  goes along with share ownership.  To
facilitate  rent transfer  to the government,  the government  mlst  succeed ill obtaining
share  holding  privileges  at below the market  value of the shares.
At  the  other  extreme,  the  government  may  simply  take  "free  equity"  in  the
firm,  thereby  entitling  itself  to  a  share  of future  divi(lends  of the  firm.  This  will
differ  from  a  rent  tax  regime  by the  fact  that  no implicit  deduction  is given  for
the initial  equity  put  in by the firm.  This  may approximate  the initial  capital  costs
incurred  by the firm.  It would then be similar to a royalty system  with  currcnt  costs
deducted.  There  are many instar!ces of such free equity  arrangements,  especially  in
hard  minerals  (copper  in Panairia.  copper  an(d nickel in  Botswana.  and  uraniullm inl
Gabon).
Instea(l  of taking  free equity,  the  government  may  pay  somen  price  for  it.  As
mentioned,  to  obtain  sorne share  of the  rents,  the price  would have to  be less than
the  market  price  of the  shares  taken.  The  could  be  (lone up  front  or it  coul(d be
made  later  by reducing  future  dividends.  Equity  sharing  schemes of this  formn  will
be  equivalent  to  rent  taxes  if  the  payment  made  by  the  government  is cqual  in
present  value  ternms  to  an  equivalent  share  of the  cash  costs  of the  project.  If this
payment  is made  up  front,  it  would  have  the  idcrntical  financial  cffect  as a  cash  flow
tax.  The  only  real  difference is that  the  government  obtains  voting  rights.  If the
payment  is spread  out into tile futuire (e.g.. taken  out  of futulre dividernds). it should
be carried  forward  with  interest.  In either  case. the government  will obtain  only  a
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3.  Other  Design  Issues
There are  a numlb)er  of other  (lesign  iSSU(eS  invol  Ve(d  in resource  taxatioii  which mIay
cause them  to  (liffer  froiri ideal reiit  taxes.  SonII of them  are as follows.
i.  The  Time  Horizon
As Imentione(l,  arrangenients  with  thc  l)rivate  sector  for sliarinig rents  may  be viewed
as  being  for  a  hinited  period  of tille.  This  iray  b)e because  of conscious  design,  as
in  the  case  of forestry  (on(e(CSSiOn.  Or.  it  inay  he  because  of the  inevitable  inability
of governmenits  to  comrmiit to  fixed  policies  for  long  perio(ls  of  tirne.  In  any  case,
the  result  is  arn inefficiency  which1 is  har(d to  avoi(l.
ii.  Shlut-Down  Costs
Many  non-renewa)lc  resource  operations  face  costs  of shlut-downi  such  as  clean-up
costs  to  avoi(l  environmental  darmiage.  Simnply requirinig  firms  to  meet  such  costs
rrlay  be  unenforceal)le  since  they  imay  be  able  to  avoi(d theni  b)y juist  ablandornirng
the  site.  Clean  upj)  could  be  enforced  by  re(quiring  the  firiim to  post  bonds  against
the  cost  of  cleanpll).  or,  equivalently.  by  imposing  a  witlhlhol(linig tax  ill  respect  of
resource  nianagemlient  which  is  refundable  once  the  clean  uip is  completed.
iii.  Discretionar,y  Polici.s
Sone  sorts  of policies  niav  involve  admtninistrative  diiscretion.  Econoniists  generally
view  these  Sor'ts  of  policies  witlh  soe  suspici(  on  and  p)refer  those  for  which  the
terni.s  of eligilbility  are  aiit  mniatic. Discretioinary  policies  lend  themselves  to  costly
rent-seeking  activitics  as  well  as  to  possibilities  for  dishonest  behaviour.
iv.  .JuIrisdictional  Issiies
In  iiianiy countries  jurisdiction  over  resources  is dlecentralized  at  least  partly  to lower
levels  of goverunmenit.  Examples  include  Malaysia  and( Canada.  This  can  give  rise
to  problems  of  tax  coordination  amnonig various  levels  of  government  as  well  as  to
different  fiscal  capacities  amlong  lower  levels  of  g-overnment.  As  the  literature  on
fiscal  federalism  makes  1calr.  the  latter  can  cause  ime(pli tics  across  the  federation
and  inl(effi(ci('en('y  in  the  allocation  of mobile  factors  of produllction  in  favouir of the
wealthier  states,  Many  coumitries  have  institute(l  mechanisms  to  etiable  at  least
552solne(( shaie  of  1(ollres  ore  ret  to  be  shared  armoilg  states.
v.  International  Aspects
Many  of  the  firrnis that  operate  in  less  (leveloped (lcountries  are  foreign  firtmls. This
gives  rise  to  variotus  other  issues.  For  one.  (certaini  tax  measllres  imay  lbe p)Icferrcd
to  others  to  the  extent  that  foreign  tax  cre(litinlg  is facilitat  d.  Use of thle ii  oluiie
tax  systerm  rather  tharn  frec  eq(uity  or  lproduction  sh]ar'ilng arrangements  iiiay have
that  property.  As  well,  the  ab)ility  of  foreign  coihl)ailies  to  slhift  profits  throngh
transfer  pricing  an(l  other  ni(als  will  liniiit the  extent  to  whicli  soni  tyl)es  of taxes
oxn  resource  rents  will  be effective.  This  imiay  help  to  accoinlt  for  the, growinig  use of
other  imeasures  such  as royalties,  equity  particip)ation  aii(l leasing  of prop)erty rights.
4.  Conclusion
Developing  country  governments  have  become  increasingly  conscious  of  thhe desir-
ability  of levying  taxes  on  ccononIic  rents  arisinig  fromIrl  nattural  resources  occurring,
withini  their  )ound(aries.  At  the  same  timle they  have  slhown increasing  sophistica-
tion  in  modifying  the  crude  fiscal  instrmnients  that  have  1)een traditionally  usedl for
this  purpose  in  order  to  bOth  decrease  the  efficieiicy  costs  arising  froiii  the  use  of
imperfect  rent  taxes  and  increase  the  prop)ortioni  of  the  rents  that  they  are  able  to
attach  for  pulblic  purposes.  The  timili has  now  l)eeIl  reached  in  iniany  coulntries  at
which  the  gains  frorrm  further  refinemnent of what  are  lbasically  very  crudle taxes  such
as royalties  an(I export  levies mlighlt  be far exb  ee(lc(l l)y replacing  t hem  w'tli  inicih
simpler  fornms of pare  remit taxes.
53APPENDIX:
Measuring  Marginal  Effective  Tax  Rates
in  Resource  Industries
The  riargiinal  effective tax  rate  measures  the difference between  the pre-tax  rate  of
return  on the mnarginal  investmrient  and( the after-tax  return  to savers.  The latter  can
be inferred  from  observed  market  rates  of return.  The formner  is rtmore  problematic
because  the rmarginal investment  project  cannot  be identified.  In. tead,  the return  on
the marginal  investment  project  is inferred  from the user  cost of capital.  Consider,
for  examplle,  the  case  of (lel)reciable  capital  (discussed al)ove.  The  value  of  the
rnarginal  prodilct of one uniit of capital  in real termils  is given by (9').  To convert  it
into a rate of return  expression,  two steps rmiust  be taken.  First,  the entire  expression
is divided  through  by qt so it represents  the  rnarginal  product  per  dlollar of capital.
Then,  to  make it  a  rate  of return  the  economic  depreciation  rate  (6 - Aq/q)  is
suibtracted  out.  This  leaves  r  as  the  rate  of return  on  the  marginal  investment.
That  is  also  the  rate  of return  on  saving,  so the  marginal  effective  tax  rate  is
naturally  zero in  the  absence of taxes.
Suppose  now we take  a very  simple, but  representative,  corporate  tax  system.
Let  the rate  of depreciation  for tax purposes  be a  applied  on an  historical  basis  to
unldepreciated  capital.  Suppose  that  interest  deductions  are  allowed on  debt,  but
no  (leductions  are  allowe(d for  the  costs  of equity.  Also suppose  that  there  is  an
investmyient tax  credit  in  placc  at  the  rate  0  based  oIl gross  investment.  The  tax
rate  is u.  Then,  it can  be sh0owI  that  the expression  for the  value of the  marginal
pro(luct  of capital  (9')  muiist  be amendcd as follows:
_qt  +  r  - Nq,
PItFK,  - --  -t__  (9  )
where  r  is the  real  cost of fund(ls  to  the firm.  Sn rpose  a proportion  ,  of the  firm is
financedl by debt  and( the  rest  by equity,  and( the nomrinal costs  of debt  and  equity
are i ani  (  p respectively.  Then.  given interest  deductibility,  r is given by:
r =  3 tit(l  - u) + (1 - / 3,)pt  - 7r.  (10)
In interpreting  eqUatioIn (9"),  note  that  ua/(r  + a)  is the  present  value  of future
tax  savings  dile to  depreciation.  Thus,  given the investmnent tax  credit,  the  second
bracketed  term  onl the  right-lhanid si(le of (9")  can  be  thought  of as  the  effective
price  of  nIew investment.
The p)re-tax rate  of return  caan be  constructed  as above.  It  is given by:
54=  (  (16  +-.  (9  -
Given  the  tax  parameters  anxd  cstimSites of the  true  depreciation  rate  and  the  cost
of funds  to the firm, r.  can be calculated.  To obtain  the rnarginal  effective tax rate,
the  after-tax  rate  of return  rn  must  be  subtracted  from r..  The  after-tay  rate  of
return  is given by rn  =  Ptit  + (1  - 03)pt.
Next,  we want  to  apply  the  saxne methodology  to  a  non-renewable  resource
firm.  We consider  a firm which is simultaneously  involved in exploration,  investment
in  mining  facilities,  and  extraction.  Inventories  are  excluded  sco  that  sales  equal
extraction;  it  would be  relatively  straightforward  to  add  inventories.  The  taxation
of resources  is notoriously  complex in practice.  For illustrative  purposes  we consider
a relatively  simple  scheme which incorporates  most  of the key issues.
In  the  exploration  stage,  the  firm  hires  current  inputs  L  at  a  price  W  and
produces  a  depletable  asset  according  to  the  strictly  concave  function  S(L).  (We
are deleting  time  subscripts  for simplic-ity.) It  then invests  in mining capital  K  at a
price  Q to make the asset  ready {or extraction.  The production  function  is Z(K,  F)
where  F  is the  current  use of previously  discovered asset.  This  is the only  stage  at
which  depreciable  capital  is used,  though  it  weuid  be  straightforward  to  allow for
it at  either  of the other  two stagcs.  Finally,  the  firm extracts  an  amount  Y of the
resource  according  to the strictly  convex nomiLnal  cost function  C(Y)  and  sells it  at
a price  P.
The  tax  regime  facing  the  firm  consists  of two  taxes  --  a  corporate  tax  and  a
simple  royalty  or severance  tax based  on total  revenues.  The corporate  tax  involves
write-off provisions  foc depreciation  and  interest  costs dnd an investment  tax  credit
as  above,  as  above  as  well as  some  deduction  for  the  use  of the  asset  itself  (a
depletion  allowance).  We assume  a royalty  tax  rate  of g based  olI total  revenues.
The  corporate  tax  liability  will be written:
Tc =-u[PY - C(Y)  - WL  - oA  - R - iB] + fQI.
where  A is the  accounting  value  of the  capital  stock  for tax  purposes.  Here,  R is
the  depletion  allowance and  is defined to be:
R  = t(PY  - C(Y)-aA)
though  most  systems  are more  complicated  than  that.  All other  variables  are  the
same  as defined  earlier.
Given  this,  the  expression  for the  cash flow of the firm is defined  to  be:
55CF=  PY(1-u(l-t)-g)-C(Y)(1-u(l-t))-WL(1-u)-Q(l-f)I+oAu(l-t)
where  the accounting  capital  stock  is defined as in  (6) and  investment  is related  to
the  real capital  stock  as in  (5).
The  firm maximizes  the  present  value of its  cash  flow discounted  by the  nom-
inal  cost  of funds  r  '- 7r dcbfined  by (10)  and  subject  to  the  following two resource
constraints:
(Y  - Z(F,K))dt  <  0
J(F  - S(L))dt  < 0.
The nirst states  that  the total  resource extracted  cannot  exceed  the total  developed,
while  the  second  states  that  the  total  resource  developed  cannot  exceed  the  total
found.  (In a more general version of this problem,  this constraint  would have to hold
at  each point  in  time.)  The  solution  to  this  problem  yields  the following marginal
conditions  to be  satisfied:
I  (1u-)-pc  )  r  - + (r *"-ZK  i~  u1-t
p-c'z  1-u q  1  -U(1  F  L  -gi  -t'/  r9  r
p  ~ZFSL=  u
z(p  - c')  rg
p-cl  (1  U(1 -t))(1  -
The  first  of these  is simply the  pre-tax  marginal  product  of capital.  To convert  it
to  rg simply  subtract  6 - Aqlq  as before.  The second  equation  is the  social value
of marginal  product  per  unit  of the  current  input  L.  An effective  tax  rate  can
be  obtained  directly  by subtracting  unity  from  it.  The  final equation  is a form  of
Hotelling's  rule.  It  gives  the  pre-tax  rate  of return  to  society  from  not  extracting
the resource.  It can be converted  to an effective tax wedge by subtracting  rn.  These
can be used to calculate  marginal  effective tax rates for a given institutional  setting.
Notice that  the corporate  tax and the royalty system interact  in each of the decisions
of the  firm - the  current  input  decision. the depreciable  capital  input  decision  and
the extraction  decision.
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